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The purpose of this thesis was to develop a course of 
instruction to teach key squadron safety personnel basic 
principles involved with aircraft mishap investigation, 
reporting, and management. While Aviation Safety Officers 
and Aircraft Mishap Board (AMB) Senior Members do receive 
some instruction in the process of mishap investigation and 
related procedures, no training is available that provides 
"hands-on" experier1ce in actually conducting mishap 
investigations, preparing mishap investigation reports, and 
managing an investigation effort in a realistic operational 
setting. Instructional System Development procedures were 
used to develop a training program based on analysis of 
knowledge and skills required to carry out the duties of 
squadron AMB members, duty office watch teams, and other 
relevant squadron personnel. The final course of 
instruction consists of three major segments, one for AMB 
training, one for the Squadron Duty Office Watch Team, and 
another for a Base-Wide Simulation exercise. Each 
instructional segment is complete with learning objectives, 
lesson plan, and instructional materials, and is considered 
ready for implementation by fleet squadron safety 
departments. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. STATEMENT OF TBE OBJECTIVE 
The purpose of this thesis is to develop an aviation 
premishap training program which will support squadron 
designated Aircraft Mishap Board (AMB} Senior Members and 
squadron Aviation Safety Officers (ASO) in preparing, 
improving, and managing their current squadron premishap 
readiness posture. Squadron premishap training is an 
integral part of an aviation command's overall Aviation 
Safety Program. A squadron that encompasses organized, 
understandable, and relevant premishap training for its 
Aircraft Mishap Board, Squadron Duty Office, and squadron 
safety personnel possesses the "Safety Attitude" necessary 
to prevent and minimize squadron aviation hazards. Should 
an aircraft mishap occur, this same premishap training 
provides essential squadron personnel the educatioual 
information and techniques required to professionally manage 
and control this complex incident. In addition, prior 
premishap training improves the quality and efficiency of 
post-mishap investigation efforts and reporting 
requirements. The improvement in quality and efficiency 
realized from this prior training will increase the 
probability of determining the cause of an aircraft mishap. 
• 
Thus, supporting the purpose of the aircraft misr.ap 
investigation effort; to determine the cause(s) of a mishap 
and the damage and/or injury occurring in the course of the 
mishap, in-order to prevent mishap reoccurrence. 
A course of instruction is developed by this thesis that 
enables the AMB Senior Member and/or the squadron Aviation 
Safety Officer to provide premishap training to selected 
members and segments of the squadron "Safety Team." 
This document should facilitate an improved understanding of 
premishap training information and also equip the ASO with a 
set methodology for transferring this learned knowledge lnto 
actual, hands-on implementation. This "transfer-of-training" 
will be supported by emphasizing and reiterating important 
premishap training procedures and techniques to the squadron 
ASO and presenting strategies in which to implement and 
teach these methods. 
The "Squadron Premishap Training Program" developed in 
this thesis focuses on three distinct areas of premishap 
training. These areas are: 1) Aircraft Mishap Board 
training, 2) Squadron Duty Office Watch Team training, and 
3) base-wide mishap simulation training. By providing AMB 
lecture lessons, media recommendations, planning and 
coordinating information, simulations material, specific 
aircraft mishap references, etc., within these three 
training areas, the AMB Senior Member and/or the squadron 
2 
Aviation Safety Officer will possess the information, 
encompassed in a single document, enabling them to prepare, 
conduct, and evaluate a thorough squadron premishap training 
program. 
B. BACKGROUND 
1. Aviation Safety Programs 
Aviation Safety Programs, Department of the Naval 
Postgraduate School located in Monterey, California provides 
aviation safety training to prospective Aviation Safety 
Officers. The Aviation Safety Officer Training Course is a 
28 day (five week) course which consists of approximately 
146 classroom and laboratory hours, plus a two-day field 
trip. Subjects addressed in the classroom and laboratory 
during the course include aviation safety programs, mishap 
prevention techniques, operational aerodynamics and 
aerostructures, mishap investigation and reporting, aviation 
psychology, safety law and aeromedical support. [Ref. 1] 
This command also provides a 32 hour (one-week) safety 
training course to commanding officers, executive officers, 
officers in charge of aviation detachments, officers 
screened for command, and staff officers in the rank of 
Lieutenant Commander, USN, and Major, USMC, and above via 
the Aviation Safety Command Course [Ref. 1]. The Aviation 
Safety Command Course prepares graduates for the duties 
3 
required of an Aircraft Mishap Board Senior Member. As 
stated above, these two curricula provide extensive tralnlng 
in many different aviation safety related fields, preparing 
graduates to assist in and administer aggressive mishap 
prevention programs. 
Although the Aviation Safety Officer and Aviation 
Command Course graduates possess a wealth of premishap 
knowledge, these individuals are not given all of the tools 
required to administer, instruct, and evaluate a thorough 
premishap training program. The pro~ram developed by this 
thesis begins where the Aviation Safety Programs curriculum 
concludes. The "Squadron Premishap Training Program" 
supplies the Aviation Safety Programs graduate with a 
t~aining format specifically designed to transfer the 
premishap wisdom and procedures they learned in Monterey, 
into the operational "fleet" environment. 
2. Naval Aviation Safety Program 
As stated in [Ref. 2] the purpose of the Naval 
Aviation Safety Program is to preserve human and material 
resources. In preserving these resources the Naval Aviation 
Safety Program enhances operational readiness by 
safeguarding the critical human and material resources 
necessary to accomplish naval aviation missions. The Naval 
Aviation Safety Program accomplishes this by promulgating 
specific safety rules and procedures and then actively 
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training and educating Navy and Marine Corp Officers in 
accordance with these requirements [Ref. 2]. These methods 
aid immensely in preventing damage and injury to naval human 
and material resources. In preventing potential causes of 
damage and injury, termed hazards by Reference 2, the Naval 
Aviation Safety Program does in fact accomplish its primary 
objective. 
Encompassed within the scope of the Naval Aviation 
Safety Program are all activities that might detect, 
contain, or eliminate hazards in naval aviation [Ref. 2]. 
These activities contain all possible phases, policies, and 
procedures relating to naval aviation. By including all 
=acets of naval aviation into the Naval Aviation Safety 
Program, no responsible area or activity is left out of the 
program's range. This all-encompassing posture is a primary 
reason for the program's continued success. 
The Naval Aviation Safety Program is based on the 
doctrine of "necessitarianism" [Ref. 21. This doctrine 
states that "events are inevitably determined by preceding 
causes, and on a corollary of that doctrine; events may be 
prevented by elimination of their cause~" [Ref. 2]. Because 
the primary purpose of the Naval Aviation Safety Program is 
preserving human and material resources, this doctrine 
implies that by eliminating a preceding casual factor to a 
5 
mishap, the actual mishap might be prevented there by 
preserving our vital resources. 
3. Command Aviation Safety Programa 
A command's aviation safety program is the micro-
level version of the Naval Aviation Safety Program 
established for individual squadron use. An individual 
Squadron Aviation Safety Program consists of those written 
policies, procedures, and plans coupled with the attitudes 
and practices of the command that promote aviation safety 
within the command [Ref. 2). Analogous to the Naval 
Aviation Safety Program, the purpose of the commands' 
Aviation Safety Program is to preserve the squadrons' human 
and material resources. Accomplishing this goal will 
ultimately enhance the overall operational readiness and 
morale of the squadron. 
As explained by OPNAVINST 3750.6Q, the objectives of 
a Command Aviation Safety Program are very similar to those 
of the larger Naval Aviation Safety Program. These 
objectives, the elimination of safety hazards within the 
command and the improving of safety awareness in all 
squadron personnel, strengthen and support the objective of 
the Navy-wide program [Ref. 2]. The Command Aviation Safety 
Program is able to achieve these objectives by incorporating 
safety awareness training into the squadron training 
priorities, by detecting and eliminating hazards and 
6 
hazardous conditions, and by demanding high standards of 
conduct and performance from all Navy and civilian 
Department of Defense (DoD) personnel. 
The Command Aviation Safety Program within the 
individual squadron is a collection of many different safety 
related programs and functions. These programs and 
functions are all established and managed by the squadron 
Commanding Officer via the respective Safety Department. 
The squadron Commanding Officer is responsible for 
establishing and maintaining a set of command safety goals 
and objectives, establishing and enforcing the command 
safety standards, and creating the optimal safety 
environment in which safety hazard detection and elimination 
are enhanced. [Ref. 2] The Commanding Officer is also 
responsible for promoting and governing safety education, 
safety training, and safety awareness programs within the 
squadron. Specific elements incorporated into the standard 
Command Aviation Safety Program and specifically directed by 
OPNAVINST 3750.6Q include: 
1. Fostering a command climate that promotes the 
objectives of the program. 
2. Establishing a clear set of aviation safety goals and 
policies that define individual responsibilities in 
attaining these goals. 
3. Defining a command safety organization stating 
specific tasks, functions, and responsibilities of 
each member within the organization. 
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4. Establishing an Aviation Safety Council and an 
Enlisted Aviation Safety Committee to assist in 
manag1ng and reviewing command safety policies. 
5. Conducting periodical safety standdowns and safety 
surveys to enhance the squadrons' safety posture. 
6. Conducting and documenting periodic safety training to 
include general safety training issues. 
7. Enhancing and encouraging the exchange of safety 
information within the command and between other DoD 
activities. 
8. Investigating and reporting all hazards as required by 
OPNAVINST 3750.6Q, OPNAVINST 4790.2, and other 
applicable directives. [Ref. 2:pp. 2-3]. 
The squadron Aircraft Mishap Board is another 
principal aspect of a Command's Aviation Safety Program. 
The squadron AMB is a standing board comprised of members 
appointed by the squadron Commanding Officer. The board is 
comprised of at least four officers: an Aviation Safety 
Officer, a flight surgeon, an officer well qualified in 
aircraft maintenance, and an officer well qualified in 
aircraft operations. [Ref. 2] In addition, one member of 
the board is designated as the Senior Member for the AMB. 
The Senior Member, a designated Naval Aviator or designated 
Naval Flight Officer, is responsible for the training and 
readiness of the AMB (Refer to OPNAVINST 3750.6Q, paragraph 
206 for a complete listing of AMB requirements). The 
primary purpose of the AMB is to detect and eliminate future 
aviation hazards by investigating and reporting squadron 
8 
mishaps. The squadron AMB plays a major role in develop~ng 
and maintaining a strong aviation premishap program. 
C. PREMISBAP PLAN 
Another integral part of the Command Aviation Safety 
Program is the squadron premishap plan. The squadron 
premishap plan is an emergency response instruction 
primarily used by Navy/Marine Corp commands for initiating 
reporting and investigative procedures used in the event of 
an a1rcraft mishap involving aircraft, equipment, or 
personnel assigned to that command. The premishap plan 
works as an emergency action checklist prompting and 
sequencing the Squadron Duty Office Watch Team or other 
controlling authority on ~ needs to be accomplished and 
when it should be done. All reasonable eventualities 
should be anticipated and measures taken, and incorporated, 
into the premishap plan to prepare and assist squadron 
personnel in managing and controlling a mishap situation 
[Ref. 2 J • In accordance with OPNAVINST 3750.6Q, the 
squadron premishap instruction should contain many potential 
pre-and-post mishap items. An example of a few of these 
items are as follows: 
1. Provisions for periodic drills of the premishap plan, 
2. Staff pre/post mishap responsibilities, 
including flight surgeon/medical, 
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3. AMB task organization, 
4. Responsibilities for transportation issues, 
5. Description of arrangements for obtaining photo 
coverage of mishaps, 
6. Description of coordination with local Public 
Affairs Office (PAO), Explosive Ordnance 
Disposal (EOD), and civil/military medical 
activities, 
7. Procedures for use of local crash plan and for 
requesting emergency assistance, 
8. Responsibilities of Commanding Officer, 
Executive Officer, Squadron Duty 0fficer, etc., 
9. Formats of required reports and investigative 
responsibilities of each AMB member [Ref. 2:pp. 2-6]. 
The squadron premishap plan is prepared and revised by 
the command's Aviation Safety Officer. The ASO receives 
specific premishap plan maintenance training while attending 
the Aviation Safety Officer Course in Monterey. Individual 
premishap instructions (plans) are expected to vary widely 
in content depending on the command's mission, resources, 
environment, and personnel. They should, however, include 
all information necessary to guide a squadron through the 
required reporting, investigating, coordinating, and 
managing functions that arise when an aircraft mishap 
occurs. 
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D. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
As mentioned earlier, squadron premishap training is an 
integral part of a Command's Aviation Sa.fety Program. 
Cu1rently, squadron AMB Senior Members and Aviation Safety 
Officers are provided with the classroom knowledge and 
materials necessary to conduct an aggressive squadron mishap 
prevention program through training provided by Aviat1on 
Safety Programs, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey. These 
graduates are also supplied with several tools to assist 
them in conducting squadron AMB training and premishap plan 
revision. However, no training vehicle currently exists 1n 
the Navy to fully assist these trained individuals in 
transferring this wealth of information, specifically mishap 
investigations, reporting, and management information to the 
"real world" operational environment. 
E. SCOPE OF TBE PROGRAM 
In order to provide comprehensive and functional 
premishap training, all departments, units, and personnel 
directly involved in mishap management need to be involved. 
The purpose of the "Squadron Premishap Training Program" 
developed in this thesis is to provide this training by 
addressing three specific premishap training areas, stated 
earl1er: 1) AMB training, 2) Duty Office Watch Team 
training, and 3) mishap simulation training. By 
1 1 
incorporating these three training areas into one 
comprehensive program, the squadron AMB Senior Member and/or 
squadron Aviation Safety Officer will possess the premishap 
knowledge, as well as the instructional means and methods, 
to fully implement and evaluate a functional squadron 
premishap training program. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. OVERVIEW 
The design and development of purposeful instructional 
material is a task that requires knowledge and skills 
extracted from many different segments of the education 
profession. Learning and applying the different theories 
and practices of this demanding discipline require an 
extensive review of relevant instructional design principles 
and design materials. The literature reviewed in this 
section contains all the information required to formulate, 
design, and develop a useable training curriculum specific 
to squadron premishap training. 
The primary references reviewed for this thesis discuss 
the application of instructional design principles. However, 
team communication processes and emergency response planning 
information are also reviewed because of their applicability 
to specific segments of a squadron premishap training plan. 
B. INSTRUCTIONAL DESIGN REVIEW 
Instruction is a human undertaking provided to help 
people learn. While learning may happen without 
instruction, the effects of instruction on learning are 
often beneficial and easy to observe. When instruction is 
13 
designed to accomplish a particular goal of learn~ng, ~t may 
or may not be successful. Thus, instruction must have 
certain characteristics in order to aid in the task of 
learning. In addition to containing these characteristics 
it is recognized that instruction must be planned with 
respect to daily lesson plans, course or topic instruction, 
and overall curriculum design, if it is to be effective 
[Ref. 3]. Realizing that instruction must be planned 
implies that instruction is designed and developed in some 
systematic way. This is the basic premise supporting the 
use of an instructional design methodology when developing 
instruction or an instructional curriculum. 
In planning and designing instruction, certain 
characteristics need to be followed in order to maximize the 
effectiveness of the instructional process. Gagne and 
Briggs [Ref. 4] have developed a set of specific 
characteristics for instructional design. These 
characteristics include the assumptions and methods 
described subsequently. 
First, Gagne and Briggs made the assumption that 
instructional design must be aimed at aiding the learning of 
the individual. This assumption is not concerned with large 
changes in the opinions, capabilities, or attitudes within 
societies but is oriented towards the individual. 
14 
Second, Gagne and Briggs stressed the importance of 
incorporating both iwmediate and long-range phases into 
instructional design. The immediate phase pertains to the 
instructor preparing lesson plans some hours before 
instruction. The long-range phase is concerned with th~ 
organization of lesson plans into topics, and a set of these 
topics co~stituting a course or curriculum. 
A third assumption emphasizes that systematically 
designed instruction can greatly affect individual human 
development. According to Gagne and Briggs, undirected and 
unplanned learning is likely to lead to the development of 
many individuals who are in one way or another incompetent 
to derive personal satisfaction from living in our society 
of today and tomorrow. 
The fourth idea states that instructional design should 
be conducted by means of a systems approach. The systems 
approach to instructional design involves the carrying out 
of a number of steps starting with an analysis of needs and 
goals, and ending with an evaluated system of instruction, 
which demonstrably succeeds in meeting accepted goals. [Ref. 
4] The systems approach will be discussed in greater detail 
in a later portion of the literature review. 
Finally, Gagne and Briggs believe that designed 
instruction must be based on knowledge of how human beings 
learn. According to Gagne [Ref. 4], 
1 5 
In considering how an individual's abilities are to be 
developed, it is not enough to state what they should be; 
one must examine closely the question of how they can be 
acquired. Materials for instruction need to reflect not 
simply what their author knows, but also how the student 
is intended to learn such knowledge. Accordingly, 
instructional design must take fully into account learning 
conditions that need to be established in order for the 
desired effects to occur [p. 5] . 
As referenced by Gagne, learning conditions are an 
important aspect of instructional design. Learning 
conditions or learning principles have been researched and 
investigated by psychologists for many years. These 
learning principles, which include contiguity, repetit1on, 
and reinforcement are all good, solid principles but 
including these learning principles in instruction does not 
guarantee an efficient learning situation [Ref. 5]. Gagne 
believes that the missing learning conditions are to be 
sought within the individual, rather than the external 
environment. These conditions are the states of mind that 
the student brings to the learning situation, usually in the 
form of previously learned capabilities or preferences. 
Because these capabilities are considered a highly important 
set of factors in insuring effective learning, the 
instructional designer and course instructor should research 
student requisite knowledge requirements and capabilities 
prior to commencing instructional planning [Ref. 5]. 
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C. SYSTEMATIC DESIGN 
In order to design instruction systematically, a 
rationale for what specific subject, topic, or issue to be 
learned must first be established [Ref. 6). This requires 
the instructional designer to revisit the recognized reason 
or need that brought about the demand for the instruction. 
A system of instruction may then be constructed starting 
with a base of information that reflects these identified 
goals. 
Gagne and Briggs maintain that the design of instruction 
is separated into four distinct levels. These levels, wh1ch 
include the system level, the course level, the lesson 
level, and the evaluotion level include stages which further 
define the design methodology. These various levels and 
stages ~re listed in Table 2.1. 
Even though these stages are listed as discrete steps 
shown in a sequential, linear fashion, emphasis is placed on 
the iterative nature of the design process [Ref. 4). This 
is to say that in actual design there is alot of work~ng 
backwards and forward in a non-linear, non-sequential 
fashion. This occurs because work done at any one stage 
gives new insights into the other stages. This results in 
alot of "working back and forth" through the different 
stages as the total instructional design process develops 
[Ref. 4] . 
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TABLE 2.1 STAGES IN DESIGNING INSTRUCTIONAL SYSTEMS 
SYSTEM LEVEL 
1. Analysis of Needs, Goals, and Priorities 
2. Analysis of Resources, Constraints, and Alternate 
Delivery Systems 
3. Determination of Scope and Sequence of Curriculum 
and Courses; Delivery System Design 
COURSE LEVEL 
4. Determining Course Structure and Sequence 
5. Analysis of Course Objectives 
LESSON LEVEL 
6. Definition of Performance Objectives 
7. Preparing Lesson Plans 
8. Developing, Seleci..ing Materi?.: ,, Media 
9. Assessing Student Performance (Performance Measures) 
EVALUATION SYSTEM LEVEL 
10. Teacher Preparation 
11. Formative Evaluation 
12. Field Testing, Revision 
13. Summative Evaluation 
14. Installation and Diffusion 
Souro~: "Principles of Instructional Design", p. 23. 
Note: This model consists of four discrete levels with 
fourteen associated stages. 
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The first three design stages focus upon the 
determination of needs and goals sought as the outcomes from 
an entire course of instruction. These needs and goals are: 
reviewed in terms of resources available and the possible 
delivery systems that could be employed for the intended 
instruction. This preliminary work broadly views the entlre 
scope of outcomes desired. The goals at this point are thus 
broadly stated, and often arranged in the form of a 
curriculum scope and sequence statement, showing the desired 
outcomes for each course. These three stages are labelled 
as work done at the "system (or curriculum)level." [Ref. 4] 
The next two stages of work consist of considering 
separately each course to be planned. The two principal 
products are the determination of the overall structure of 
each course in terms of major units of instruction and a 
listing of the objectives to be achieved by the end of the 
course. These analyses are thus described as "course level" 
analyses. [Ref. 4] 
The next four stages or steps of work are described as 
working at the "lesson level." This consists of defining 
detailed performance objectives, preparing lesson plans, 
developing course materials and selecting media, and 
preparing measures for assessing student performance. 
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D. PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES 
Defining and preparing detailed performance or 
instructional objectives are an important part of the 
instructional design process [Ref. 7]. Robert Mager gives 
three specific reasons explaining the significance of 
performance objectives. 
First, when clearly defined objectives are lacking, 
there is no sound basis for the selection or designing of 
instructional materials, content, or methods. If you 
don't know where you're going, it is difficult to select a 
suitable means for getting there. After all, machinists 
and surgeons don't select tools until they know what 
operation they are going to perform. 
A second important reason for stating objectives 
sharply has to do with finding out whether the objective 
has, in fact, been accomplished. Tests or examinations 
are the mileposts along the road of learning and are 
supposed to tell instructors and students alike, whether 
they have been successful in achieving the course 
objectives. But, unless objectives are clearly and firmly 
fixed in the minds of both parties, tests are at best 
misleading; at worst, they are irrelevant, unfair, or 
uninformative. Test items designed to measure whether 
important instructional outcomes have been accomplished 
can be selected or created intelligently only when those 
instructional outcomes have been made explicit. 
A third advantage of clearly defined objectives is 
that they provide students with the means to organize 
their own efforts toward accomplishment of those 
objectives. Experience has shown that, with clear 
objectives in view, students at all levels are better able 
to decide what activities on their part will help them get 
to where it is important for them to go. [Ref 8:pp. 5-7] 
Objectives then, are useful in providing a sound basis 
for the designing of instructional content and procedures, 
for evaluating or assessing the success of the instruction, 
and for organizing the students' own efforts and activities 
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for the accomplishment of the important instructional 
intents. Mager defines an instructional objective as a 
statement describing an instructional outcome, rather than 
an instructional process or procedure. An example of an 
acceptable learning objective is as follows: 
In at least two computer languages, be able to wr1te 
and test a program to calculate arithmetic means [Ref 8:p. 
1 1 ] • 
This example clearly describes an outcome of the 
instruction, something the student is expected to do. An 
instructional process or procedure would not describe an 
outcome but would state how the student could develop the 
computing skill shown in the example. 
E. LESSON PLAN DEVELOPMENT 
Preparing lesson plans is another important step 
accomplished by the instructional designer at the "lesson 
level." In designing a lesson one needs to insure that the 
general events of instruction are provided for. These 
general instructional events, taken from Principles of 
Instructional Design, by Gagne and Briggs, are listed in 
Table 2.2. These learning principles are processes that 
make instructinn possible. The order of these events for a 
lesson or lesson segment is only approximate, and may vary 
somewhat depending on the lesson objective. Not all 
elements are invariably used. [Ref. 4:p. 170] 
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It is also necessary to classify the lesson as hav1ng a 
particular type of learning objective. Gagne and Briggs 
[Ref. 9] explain that once lesson classification has been 
accomplished then it is possible to place the lesson in a 
sequence relating to its prerequisite. For example, lesson 
objectives that specify the learning of fairly complex 
skills would require the prior learning of simpler skills in 
order for the instruction to be effective [Ref. 9:p. 85]. 
This type of sequencing is necessary if effective learning 
is to occur. In addition to sequencing, it is important to 
incorporate into the instructional events of the lesson, 
listed in Table 2.2, the conditions for effective learning 
appropriate to the area being taught. These events are 
brought about by whatever media are selected as most 
appropriate for the purpose. Gagne and Briggs further 
recommend that designing lesson plans include the following 
four phases [Ref. 4:p. 34]: 
1. List the instructional events to be brought into 
play to accomplish the objective of the lesson. 
2. Determine the materials, media, or agents to be 
employed for making each event possible. 
3. Design or plan learning activities, including plans for 
how media and materials are to be used. 
4. Preview the selected media and materials to plan the 
roles or events which the teacher needs to accomplish 
for the lesson. 
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These steps are emphasized by Gagne and Briggs to 
incorporate the appropriate sets of conditions of learning 
into a plan for bringing about each instructional event, ~n 
order that the learners achieve the objective of the lesson 
[Ref. 4]. 
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TABLE 2 . 2 EVENTS OF INSTRUCTION, AND TBBIR RELATIONS TO 
PROCESSES OF LEARNING 
INSTRUCTIONAL EYENT RELATION TO LEARNING PROCESS 
1. Gaining Information Reception of patterns of 
neural lrnpulses 
2. Informing the Learner 
of the Objective 
3. Stimulating Recall of 
Prerequisite Learnings 
4. Presenting the Stimulus 
Material 
5. Providing "Learning 
Guidance" 
6. Eliciting the Performance 
7. Providing Feedback About 
Performance Correctness 
8. Assessing the Performance 
9. Enhancing Retention and 
Transfer 
Activating a process of 
executive control 
Retrieval to working memory 
Emphasizing features for 
selective perception 
Semantic encoding 
Activating a response 
organization 
Establishing reinforcement 
Activating retrieval; making 
reinforcement possible 
Providing cues and strategies 
for retrieval 
Source: "Principles of Instructional Design," p. 157. 
F. MEDIA SELECTION 
In developing instructional design theories and 
methodologies, there has been considerable research and 
development in the important subject of media aids and the 
usage of media selection aids. A study conducted by the 
Navy Personnel Research and Development Center (NPRDC) in 
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San D~ego, California, in 1988, rev~ewed 23 of the most 
current and viable military training decision aids (Ref. 
10]. The study used a list of ''Training s~tuation/Level 
Criteria'' to evaluate each training aid. These critique 
factors provide a useful set of considerations in training 
program development. The NPRDC report states that to be 
optimally effective, such aids must be appropriately 
designed and oriented to the needs of specific users. The 
study also noted that decision aids that are to be used by 
military personnel who may not be highly experienced in 
instructional systems development should provide strong user 
guidance. Many of the current training aids decision 
methods rely on a strong foundation of knowledge in the area 
of instructional development even though relying to heavily 
on instructional development practices could possibly hinder 
development of a practical, usable program. This is why it 
is important to design and utilize those media systems most 
beneficial and directly oriented to the needs of the 
specific user. 
As an expert in the field of media selection and usage, 
Robert Gagne [Ref. 11] discusses media selection factors and 
discusses them in two distinctly separate categories: 1) 
physical attributes of media, and 2) learner, setting, and 
task characteristics. In his review of ten media selection 
models, Gagne uses these two groupings to discuss the 
25 
strengths and weaknesses of the different models. Gagne 
seems to stress three primary points: 1) one must ident1fy 
the audience and environment: 2) there is no one medium that 
will address all factors; and 3) both categories of factors 
need to be considered in media selection. 
G. ASSESSING STUDENT PEIU'ONQNCE 
As reported by Briggs [Ref. 12], preparing measures for 
assessing student performance is an essential part of the 
instructional design process. Briggs [Ref. 12:p. 46] states 
that evaluative tests should be prepared for two general 
reasons: 1) for use in tryouts and revisions of first-draft 
materials, to evaluate materials; and 2) for normal 
classroom use, to evaluate student performance. That is, 
the performance of tryout learners is used as a guide to 
evaluate and improve the materials; and when course 
revisions are completed, and the course is in normal 
operation, regular student performances are evaluated to see 
if the objectives of the instruction have been met. Briggs 
further explains that since tests are needed for both of the 
above purposes, the course development phase could include 
preparation of tests for all of the following levels of 
objectives in the course: 1) end-of-course objectives; 2) 
end-of-unit objectives; 3) specific behavioral objectives; 
and 4) subordinate competencies of specific objectives. 
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The specific rationality for us1ng these levels is explained 
by Briggs [Ref. 12] as follows, 
Tests at all four levels of objectives are also useful 
for evaluation of performance of the student population 
after the course is in normal operation. Tests over 
competencies of an objective are useful for remedial 
purposes, to find the source of trouble when a student 
fails a test over a specific behavioral objective. Tests 
at the level of specific objectives can assure the teacher 
that the student is ready to go on to the next objective. 
Tests over units can reveal the learner's mastery over 
more complex objectives. End-of-course tests can measure 
the student's ability to use all his prior learning to 
solve still more complex problems or to apply his 
knowledge to a wider range of situations [p. 47]. 
B. MILITARY INSTRUCTIONAL SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT 
Instructional Systems Development (ISD) is a systematic 
means for defining training goals, deciding upon the best 
means of achieving goals within resource constraints, and 
providing evaluation of the program [Ref. 13]. The emphasis 
here is placed on instruction based on clearly defined 
needs. Training developed by ISD takes less time to 
administer because irrelevant information is eliminated in 
the ISD process. Large cost savings have been demonstrated 
in both the military and private industry from using the 
Instructional Systems Development Approach. 
The first formal ISD procedures appeared in the 1950's 
in the military, particularly in the United States Air 
Force. The systems approach was adapted from those methods 
used by Operations Research and Systems Engineering 
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professionals in the development of military weapon systems. 
These systems-analysis methods had developed during World 
War II to help resolve problems in managing the design, 
production, and evaluatio·n of new weapon systems. This 
process was accomplished then and is accomplished today, by 
breaking tasks down into simplified descriptions of subparts 
to reduce the overall complexity of the process and create 
learnable curriculum components. [Ref. 13] 
By the end of the 1960's, the use of ISD methods had 
become common in all branches of the military service. In 
addition, ISD methods started to appear in both civilian 
industrial and commercial training applications. 
In 1981, the J.~. Office of Naval Education and Training 
in Pensacola, F~orida, published NAVEDTRA 110A Procedures 
for Instructional Systems Development. As the title 
suggests, this instruction provides specific guidance for 
the analysis, design, development, implementation, and 
control of instructional programs under the cognizance of 
the Chief of Naval Education and Training [Ref. 14]. This 
manual utilizes principles and concepts very similar to 
those discussed earlier and employed by Gagne and Briggs. 
However, this manual packages these principles and concepts 
in a very standardized and easy-to-reference format. 
NAVEDTRA 110A allows the novice instructional designer the 
majority of material required to comprehensively analyze, 
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design and develop military instruct1onal materials and 
courses. The ISO model consists of five major phases, 
listed in Table 2.3 [Ref. 15]. 
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TABLE 2.3 OVERVIEW OF THE ISD PROCESS 
1. Analysis: in this phase the developer gathers and 
analyzes information to determine: 
a. whether training is the appropriate organizational 
response to a problem, issue, or need. If so, what 
kinds of training will be needed; 
b. what goals and objectives the training should 
accomplish; 
c. profiles of the people needing training; 
d. what resources are available; and 
e. other information needed to develop a useful 
training program. 
2. Design: this phase prepares the developer for 
selecting and writing program materials. During this 
phase the developer will: 
a. write lesson/progr~m objectives; 
b. develop test items; 
c. determine design structure and sequence; 
d. decide what documentation will be needed for the 
training program; and 
e. plan program evaluation. 
3. Development: in this phase, a developer prepares 
materials for: 
a. training participants use; 
b. instructor use; 
c. training documentation; 
d. training participants evaluation; and 
e. program evaluation. 
4. Implementation: in this phase the program is actually 
carried out. Typically, this means that classes are 
held, self-paced courses are begun, or on-the-job 
training (OJT) starts. 
5. Evaluation/Control: this phases involves internal and 
external evaluation of the training program itself. 
Evaluation of training participants is usually 
considered an aspect of implementation. This phase may 
be carried out by the developer or by a specialist. 
Source: "INFO-LINE, American Society for Training and 
Development", [Ref. 1 5: p. 3] . 
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I. COURSE RESEARCH & MATERIALS REVIEW 
In addition to the instructional modeling and process 
analysis and review mentioned above, extensive course 
research and specific mishap materials review was 
undertaken. These steps were accomplished for two reasons; 
1) to determine if other Navy premishap training programs 
existed and 2) to re-educate and inform the author on the 
current premishap information, materials, and procedures 
present in the training and operational environments. 
Research to ascertain the existence of a comparable 
squadron premishap training program was conducted through 
cooperation with Aviation Safety Programs in Monterey, 
California. A thorough review of current Navy instructions 
and dialogue with the Naval Safety Center indicated that no 
other squadron premishap training program of this content 
was in existence. 
Current Aviation Safety Programs Aviation Safety Officer 
and Safety Command Course premishap and investigations 
lectures were monitored by the author in order to analyze 
and relearn relevant prPmishap information and procedures. 
The author also conducted an extensive review of OPNAV, 
COMNAVAIR, Air Force, and Army instructions and publications 
to acquire specific premishap related knowledge. 
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J. GROUP/TEAM COMMUNICATION REVIEW 
The reason Naval Commands conduct aircraft mishap 
investigations is to accurately determ~ne the causes of the 
accident and make recommendations that, once implemented, 
will prevent hazard recurrence [Ref. 2). The chances of 
finding these causes are greatly reduced if the AMB is not 
able to communicate during mishap training, during on-scene 
coordihation of an actual mishap investigation, and while 
deliberating during the mishap investigation report (MIR) 
write-up. These elements emphasize why communica~ion 
between AMB team members is a pivotal segment of mishap 
training and investigation procedures. 
Communication is the flow of information, ideas, 
co~cepts, techniques, etc., in written, verbal, or non-
verbal io~~ from a sender to a specific receiver. 
Communica~ion barriers which decrease the effectiveness of 
this information flow pose a threat to Aircraft Mishap Board 
efficiency. As listed by Massie [Ref. 16] some of the more 
common co~munication barriers which jeopardize team 
productiveness along with proposed communication remedies 
are as follows: 
Distortion may be a matter of noise in transmission or 
it may result from inadequacy of the words in carrying the 
precise ideas of the sender. An important means of 
overcoming the distortion barrier is to expand the 
horizons of each member so that each can understand the 
meaning in the minds of other members. Another means is 
to use what the psychologist calls empathy--attempt to 
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project oneself into the viewpoint of the other person. A 
major step in handling distortion is the development of an 
awareness that some degree of distortion always exists. 
Filtering is a barrier to communication that takes the 
form of intentionally sifting the information so that the 
receiver will look favorably on the message. No one l1kes 
to admit mistakes to some one else, especially the boss. 
The remedies for filtering are a well-designed control 
system, the development of rapport within the organization 
/group, reducing the fear of failure, and increasing the 
awareness of superiors to the problems of subordinates. 
Overloading of communication channels can cause the 
network to be jammed with irrelevant messages or 
information. The answer to this problem lies in 
monitoring the channels to clear messages in order of 
priority and importance. The communication system should 
provide for editing devices, or persons, to regulate the 
quality and quantity of communications with regard to 
sufficiency of information for decision centers. [Ref. 
1 6 : pp . 1 1 6 - 1 1 7 ] 
K. EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANNING REVIEW 
Reviewing disaster preparedness and airport emergency 
plan literature, specifically those studies discussing and 
examining testing airport emergency plans, was vital in 
developing the "Squadron Premishap Training Program." This 
literature contains a wealth of professional knowledge and 
material obtained from prior research and development 
conducted in this area. The training program developed by 
this thesis contains two areas, the Duty Office Watch Team 
training segment and the base-wide simulation training 
segment, which involve many of the concepts, principles, and 
methods applied in developing and implementing these prior 
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programs. A review of the literature revealed the following 
relevant disaster preparedness/airport emergency plan 
issues: 1) testing and training the plan, 2) types of 
airport emergency simulations, and 3) maintaining the plan. 
1. Testinq ' Training the Plan 
Testing an emergency plan is mandatory for 
verification that it is practical and that it uses the 
airstation, the squadron, and the surrounding community 
resources effectively. Testing, however, can only occur 
after proper emergency plan training has occurred. As 
stated by COMNAVBASE San Diego OPLAN 6-92, [Ref. 17], 
The primary objective of an effective training program 
is the achievement of the highest possible level of 
readiness to be able to respond rapidly and efficiently to 
civil disasters and as a result minimize loss of 
operational and mission readiness and ensure maximum 
survivability of personnel. It is recognized that 
achieving the optimum level of readiness may be 
constrained by limited resources. However, those charged 
with emergency management responsibilities must exercise 
initiative, creativity and maximum use of all available 
resources to attain the highest level of readiness 
possible [p. N-1]. 
Once thorough premishap/emergency response training 
has occurred, evaluation of this training program and the 
overall premishap response plan can occur. 
By conducting proper premishap/emergency response 
simulations, the actual pre-trained emergency management 
responsibilities and the overall effectiveness of the 
premishap plan can be evaluated. In addition, testing the 
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plan will facilitate several important functions; 1) it 
will give participants the opportunity to pract~ce the~r 
specific roles under various conditions, 2) it will enable 
participants to meet each other and become familiar with the 
airstation facilities, and 3) testing the plan will allow 
the squadron and the airstation to revise the procedures as 
appropriate so that the plan remains effective and current. 
[Ref. 18] 
2. Types of Simulations 
According to the Federal Aviation Administration 
[Ref. 19], Transport Canada [Ref. 18], and Jane's Airport 
Review [Ref. 20], there are three types of emergency 
preparedness drills commonly used at airports today: 1) a 
full scale mock incident, 2) table top "functional" 
simulations, and 3) partial testing using a combination 
and/or parts of the first two types. 
a. FUll Scale Test 
This simulation involves the full response of 
the airport and the surrounding community to a simulated 
airport emergency. Planning for a major exercise of this 
scope can take up to six months and in the U.S. can involve 
up to 200 "victims," acting the part of severe casualties 
[Ref. 20]. Although costly, lessons learned by these 
simulations, specifically communications and coordination 
information, have proved invaluable. 
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b. Table Top EXercises 
These emergency response drills are carried out 
in a classroom situation with all participants responding 
verbally to an emergency scenario. This format allows 
participants to describe their responses and the actions 
they would take. These types of simulations, although not 
as encompassing and thorough as the full scale simulations, 
provide valuable premishap training. For example, as stated 
by Transport Canada [Ref. 18), 
This type of exercise would immediately confirm if 
contact telephone numbers were current and that response 
times were practical. The descriptions of the procedures 
by individuals would identify gaps, iron out difficulties 
with terminology, and identify shortages of equipment [p. 
C20) . 
c. Partial Testing EXercise 
Partial simulations involve taking one or more 
elements of the entire emergency response/premishap team and 
focus the evaluation on only these areas. For example, 
evaluating the medical response team and the crash/fire team 
by having these two elements respond to a simulated exercise 
provided exclusively for them. These types of simulations 
are valuable because they allow the realism of the full 
scale simulation but are considerably less disruptive t~ 
airport operations and are less costly to conduct. An 
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example of this testing format providing valuable training 
information for a foreign airport was cited in Jane's 
Airport Review [Ref. 20], 
A recent training exercise at London/Gatewick 
highlighted communications problems w~thin the ~ccal 
ambulance services, according to the airport's Chief of 
Airside Safety and Operations, John Bourne. As a result, 
the police force---responsible for managing airport 
incidents in the UK---could not keep track of which 
casualties were sent to which hospitals [p. 36]. 
3. Maintaining the Plan 
Although testing the plan will reveal the 
effectiveness of the plan, gaps and inconsistencies in the 
plan, and an overall concept of the plan's usefulness, it is 
essential that the actual emergency response planning 
document be reviewed regularly to ensure readiness and 
currency. This periodic reassessment should include, at a 
minimum, examining; 1) telephone numbers, 2) communications 
frequencies, 3) lists of emergency equipment and supplies, 
4) changes in normal airport operations, and 5) updating or 
renewal of mutual aid agreements. [Ref. 18,19] 
L. SUMMARY 
This chapter identified and discussed many of the 
salient theories, practices, and skills required to design 
and develop a useable instructional training program. As 
this chapter revealed, the instructional development process 
requires not only a solid understanding of instructional 
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design theories and models but also requ1res a strong 
understanding of actual instructional "learning" conditions 
and principles. In addition, specific aspects of the 
c~mmunication process, pertinent to the training program 
developed in this thesis, were addressed. This chapter also 
included a detailed examination and review of relevant 
emergency response planning and training materials and 
specific military premishap information sources. 
The analysis and review of all previously mentioned 
information and material was requisite to accomplishing the 
analysis, design, and development of the "Squadron Premishap 
Training Program" produced in this thesis. 
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I I I . METHODOLOGY 
This section of the thesis introduces the research 
methods utilized by the author to design and develop the 
"Squadron Premishap Training Program." These methods will 
supply the "recipe" required to design and develop a 
training program of this scope. 
A. NEEDS ANALYSIS 
The first step in the i~structional design process is 
determining whether an actual requirement for the 
instruction exists. This was accomplished by conducting an 
informal needs/job analysis of required billet tasks and 
elements specific to Aviation Safety Officers and AMB Senior 
Members. Interviews with experienced Aviation Safety 
Officers and former AMB Senior Members were conducted. 
Detailed information concerning existing job requirements 
and standards, current safety programs training methods, and 
desired job/training improvements were discussed. 
Specifically, Aircraft Mishap Board, Squadron Duty Office 
watch team, and specific premishap training issues were 
addressed [Ref. 21]. These respondents clearly indicated a 
strong desire for an easy-to-implement and functional 
premishap training program. 
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On the basis of the needs analysis, it was determined 
that a course of instruction was required to teach key 
squadron safety personnel basic principles involved with 
aircraft mishap investigation, reporting, and management. 
While Aviation Safety Officers and Aircraft Mishap Board 
Senior Members do receive some instruction in the process of 
mishap investigation and related procedures, the needs 
analysis determined no training was available that provided 
"hands-on" experience in actually conducting mishap 
investigations, preparing mishap investigation reports, and 
managing an investigation effort in a realistic operational 
setting. 
Once the needs analysis was performed, and an actual 
demand for the instruction identified, the focus of the 
instructional process focused on the following three areas. 
These areas; 1) reviewing and analyzing instructional design 
and development literature, which built a strong and 
credible informational foundation, 2) selecting and using a 
proven training model to implement the acquired 
instructional skills and knowledge, and finally, 3) the task 
of actually designing and developing the instructional 
program. 
I:, order to give the reader a better understanding of 
the three phases introduced above, the next three segments 
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of this section will focus on the individual processes of 
literature analysis, instructional modeling, and course 
design and development procedures. 
B. LITERATURE ANALYSIS 
Thoroughly reviewing and analyzing instructional design 
and development literature provided the necessary 
information to formulate the "Squadron Premishap Training 
Program." The literature review, which is provided in 
section two of this thesis, gives an extensive summary of 
the instructional design and development theories and 
practices analyzed prior to the inception of the program. 
By analyzing instructional considerations in the larger 
macro-view, i.e., instructional theories and models, and 
examining the micro-level aspects of instructional design 
and development, i.e., designing performance objectives and 
formulating lesson plans, all facets of curriculum design 
and development were encompassed. Reviewing and applying 
these procedures provided the foundation for instructional 
design. After all, proper instructional systems development 
truly depends on following those theories and practices 
extensively accepted and used by the education profession. 
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C. INSTRUCTIONAL MODEL 
Designing and developing a purposeful and functional 
training program requires the use of a credible and proven 
training model. Several different models were researched 
and analyzed in attempting to select the most appropriate 
model for the instructional need. The model ultimately 
selected in developing the "Squadron Premishap Training 
Program" incorporated information and processes from two 
different sources--the Chief of Naval Education and Training 
and the ISD principles of Robert Gagne and Leslie Briggs. 
The Chief of Naval Education and Training (CNET) 
publication, NAVEDTRA 110A, Procedures for Instructional 
Systems Development, provided the framework for the overall 
modeling process. Incorporated into this framework were 
many of the key features of instructional design and ISO 
theories and practices advocated by Robert Gagne, Leslie 
Briggs, and other notable ISD specialists. The merger of 
these two sources of information provided the complete 
"model" used in developing this instruction. 
As referenced in the literature review, the 
Instructional Systems Development Approach provides specific 
guidance for the analysis, design, development, 
implementation, and control of instructional programs. The 
Instructional Systems Development Approach (ISD) was the 
principal instructional model used in developing the 
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"Squadron Premishap Training Program," because it provided 
both a proven instructional design model and because it is 
the model recommended by the Chief of Naval Education and 
Training for designing instructional programs. (CNET 
requires the use of this publication for all curricula 
developed within cr for use within the Naval Education 
Training Command.) 
The methodology used in researching, designing, and 
developing the "Squadron Premishap Training Program" relied 
heavily on the first three phases of the ISD model. These 
phases; analysis, design, and development were incorporated 
and utilized in program formulation. The fourth phase, 
implementation, was initiated following program development. 
Preliminary implementation of the program was conducted in 
March of 1994. Initially, five different Navy and Marine 
Corps aviation squadrons were given the program to implement 
into their Command Safety Training Programs. Extensive 
evaluation and subsequent revision of the program will need 
to be conducted in a follow-on thesis or occur at the 
individual squadron level. 
D. PROGRAM DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT 
As mentioned earlier, the methodology used in the design 
and development of this thesis incorporated the interservice 
Instructional Systems Development model with the theoretical 
43 
and applied methods of several notable ISO specialists. The 
consolidation of these materials provided a qualified 
modeling framework with the expert knowledge necessary to 
support program design. The design and development of the 
"Squadron Premishap Training Program" was accomplished by 
using this modeling framework and applying it to three 
different instructional segments; an AMB segment, a duty 
office watch team segment, and a base-wide simulations 
segment. These segments were chosen based on the 
information derived from the needs analysis and the in-depth 
review of relevant premishap information and materials. 
Learning objectives, lesson plans, and instructional 
materials and references were prepared for each 
instructional segment. (The instructional segments were 
developed in the following order; 1) AMB training segment, 
2) duty office watch team segment, and finally 3) the base-
wide simulations segment.) Specifically, the design and 
development process was accomplished using the following 
three level instructional approach. 
1. Systems Level 
The needs analysis provided the demand and the focus 
for the program. Prior experience in the aviation safety 
field, in addition to the ASO interviews and Safety School 
lecture material, defined the scope of the proposed program. 
Since premishap training primarily involves three segments 
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of the squadr0n, the squadron Aircraft Mishap Board, the 
squadron Duty Office, and the squadron Safety Department, 
individual training courses were designed specifi~ally :0r 
these three groups. These individual segments utilized 
different instructional practices to achieve a com~~~ 
desired outcome--effective squadron premishap training. 
Program and course sequencinq was determined by 
established pr~nciples discussed in the literature review. 
For example, the AMB training lessons provide the knowledge 
and understanding of requisite premishap information. These 
training lessons were designed to occur prior to the 
training program's mishap drill segment which provides a 
method to evaluate this previously learned knowledge. This 
understandable sequence provided continuity and coherence to 
the structure of the training program. Similar thought and 
sequencing rationale was used during all stages of the 
training programs design. 
2. Lesson Level 
The design of the three individual training areas 
followed the guidance and methods established in the 
literature review. 
Performance objectives were defined and prepared 
providing a focus for designing instructional content and 
procedures, for evaluating the success of the instruction, 
and for organizing the learner's own efforts and activities 
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for the accomplishment of ~mportant instruct~onal ~ntents. 
The advantages to creating performance objectives to these 
specifications ar~ listed in Section D of the literature 
review. 
Lessons were prepared insuring that the general 
instructional events, listed in Table 2.2 of the literature 
review, were provided for. These instructional events 
incorporate the appropriate sets of conditions of learning 
into a plan for bringing about each instructional event. 
These research-based events unquestionably assist the 
learners in achieving the objective of the lesson [Ref. 4]. 
This is an important factor in ensuring overall lesson plan 
effectiveness. 
Selecting media appropriate for the three different 
segments of the "Squadron Premishap Training Program" was 
accomplished by making specific media recommendations for 
each training area. Media selection involves choosing the 
best possible media method in order to stimulate the 
trainee's learning abilities while supporting achievement of 
the course training objectives. Media recommendations were 
provided to allow the premishap training instructor the 
greatest amount of media selection flexibility. Squadron 
operational and training environments often dictate specific 
meiia availability, thus recommendations that could be used, 
modified, or discarded by the instructor were furnished. 
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3. Assessment/Validation Level 
After the lesson level events were accomplished, the 
assessment or validation methods of the training program 
were specified. The primary validation method used in the 
"Squadron Premishap Training Program" was incorporated into 
the "Base-wide Simulations" section of the program. This 
section of the program used the requirements specified in 
OPNAVINST 3750.6Q and other relevant OPNAV instructions, in 
addition to the performance and knowledge based 
instructional objectives specified in the individual 
training program lessons, as criteria. Performance skills 
and/or knowledge adeptness were evaluated according to these 
established "premishap" criteria. 
The assessments used in the "Base-wide Simulations" 
section were designed to measure the effectiveness of the 
individual training areas and instructional efforts in terms 
of satisfying these stated performance and knowledge based 
criteria. These objective-referenced assessments were 
selected because they provided the best format to evaluate 
the premishap training programs overall effectiveness. 
These assessments were developed using specific guidance 
established in NAVEDTRA 110A. NAVEDTRA 110A recommends 
formulating these criterion-based evaluations by completing 
two separate steps; 1) conducting an internal review of 
lesson material and 2) using the individual trial method in 
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preparing lessons tests [Ref. 14:p. 3-175). Utilizing these 
processes as a model provided a solid format to develop 
reliable and valid premishap assessment procedures. 
In dddition to the segment assessments mentioned above, an 
end-of-course evaluation form was developed (attached as 
Appendix B-3). This evaluation form was designed to provide 
direct feedback from the programs 'trainees' to the squadron 
Safety Department. Obtaining this feedback will provide the 
squadron Safety Departments with valuable information to 
use in amending and/or modifying existing training program 
segments. 
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IV. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
As mentioned in the introduction, the purpose of this 
thesis is to develop an aviation premishap training program 
that supports squadron designated Aircraft Mishap Board 
Senior Members, Aviation Safety Officers, and Squadron 
Safety Departments in preparing, improving, and managing 
their current squadron premishap readiness posture. The 
"Squadron Premishap Training Program," provided in Appendix 
A, is a ready-to-use, established squadron premishap 
training resource that will benefit an aviation squadron in 
two ways. First, this training program provides a valuablA 
safety training resource to the squadron that emphasizes and 
highlights aviation premishap training instruction, 
materials, concepts, and practices. The training program is 
designed specifically for use by aviation safety departments 
and/or commands. Secondly, this resource is presented in a 
format that requires minimal squadron effort (manpower 
hours, resources allocation, etc.) to implement. Because 
the Aviation Safety Officer, AMB Senior Member, and squadron 
Safety Officer are all constrained by a multitude of 
additional squadron/billet requirements, the "easy-to-
implement" feature of the program gives it added worth. 
Additionally, incorporating the "Squadron Premishap Training 
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Program" into the existing squadron safety training agenda 
will further assist the Aviation Safety Officer, the 
Squadron Safety Department, and the entire command in 
realizing the purpose of the Chief of Naval Operation's 
(CNO) , Naval Aviation Safety Program; preserving the human 
and material resources used in accomplishing naval aviation 
missions [Ref. 2]. 
A. SUMMARY OF INSTRUCTION DEVELOPED 
The scope of the "Squadron Premishap Training Program" 
developed in this thesis primarily entails the analysis, 
design, and development of a training curriculum devoted to 
supporting the individual squadron's safety effort. Because 
safety information related to squadron premishap training is 
contained in many different publications and provided by 
various agencies and branches of the military service, one 
of the primary goals of this thesis was to develop a 
tr·aining document that combined these references and 
materials into a single, yet functional, instructional 
format. In addition, the instructional format of this 
training program was specifically tailored for use by Naval 
Aviation Commands. 
The instructional sequence of premishap information and 
material provided in this program will assist a Squadron 
Aviation Safety Officer, AMB Senior Member, or other 
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designated individual in effectively educating, training, 
and evaluating the primary squadron mishap participants 
involved in investigating, reporting, coordinating, and 
managing an actual mishap situation. 
Specifically, detailed training segments were designed 
and developed for the Squadron Aircraft Mishap Board and the 
Squadron Duty Office. In addition to these two training 
syllabuses, a broad-based training segment was formulated to 
assist the Squadron Safety Department in planning, 
organizing, administering, and evaluating base-wide mishap 
simulations. The integration of these three separate 
training segments resulted in the "Squadron Premishap 
Training Program," which as mentioned earlier, is provided 
in Appendix A of this thesis. A detailed analysis and 
summary of the three training segments; the AMB training 
segment, the squadron duty office training segment, and the 
base-wide premishap simulations training segment is provided 
subsequently. 
B. AIRCRAFT MISHAP BOARD TRAINING 
1. AMB Background 
The squadron Aircraft Mishap Board is a standing 
squadron board whose primary responsibility is investigating 
and reporting Naval Aviation mishaps. This board consists 
of, at a minimum, fc:~r officers: an Aviation Safety Officer, 
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a flight surgeon, an officer well qualified in aircraft 
maintenance, and an officer well qualified in aircraft 
operations. One member of the AMB is designated as the AMB 
Senior Member. This individual is required to meet the 
following conditions: 1) be a designated naval aviator or 
naval flight officer, 2) in the event of a class A mishap be 
appointed by the aircraft controlling authority and not be 
under the cognizance or direct chain-of-command of any 
reporting custodian in the mishap, and 3) be senior in rank 
to the pilot in command or the mission commander involved in 
the mishap. This designated member is also responsible for 
training and the readiness of the Aircraft Mishap Board 
within their respective squadron [Ref. 2]. 
2. Instructional Format 
The Aircraft Mishap Board training segment is 
comprised of four different instructional lessons. These 
lessons follow the lesson model provided in NAVEDTRA 110A, 
Procedures for Instructional Svstems Develqpment and 
incorporate the instructional principles developed by Robert 
Gagne and other notable instructional-design specialists. 
These lessons were specially developed to convey 
relevant AMB information to all members of the Squadron 
Aircraft Mishap Board. Because AMB membership changes quite 
regularly with squadron billet and permanent change of 
station (PCS} rotations, the AMB lesson sequence and 
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instructional content were designed to allow a newly 
designated AMB member to commence training at any time 
during the instructional process. The AMB instructor 
doesn't have to go-back to AMB Lesson One and start the 
training segment anew just because a new member joins the 
board. Lessons build on one another but do not require 
requisite lesson knowledge for comprehension (Lesson plan 
instructional content is distinctive in specific lesson 
substance but cumulative and relevant in relation to other 
lessons). In addition, the lesson format is designed to 
provide specific definition and direction to the AMB 
instructor by supplying lesson objectives, a lesson 
overview, instructional aids, an instructional outline, 
additional instructional references, and helpful notes 
within each lesson framework. The specific content and 
purpose of each of these lesson elements is defined below. 
a. Lesson Objectives 
The lesson learning objectives provide the AMB 
instructor, and the AMB members receiving the instruction, 
with the intended outcome i.e., knowledge, skill(s), or 
task(s), of each lesson. In addition, these lesson learning 
objectives provide a concrete means of evaluating the 
learned knowledge and/or performance of the AMB. Using the 
learning objective as the criterion for evaluation, a 
measure of AMB knowledge and/or skill can be obtained. 
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b. Lesson Overviev 
The lesson overview provides a brief 
comprehensive summary of the purpose of each AMB lesson. 
The overview gives the AMB instructor a background of the 
instructional content of each lesson and provides the 
instructor with a "big picture" examination cf the 
instructional events included in the lesson. 
c. Instructional Aids 
This section of the lesson provides the AMB 
instructor with a list of printed media materials 
(instructions, references, notes, AMB folders, briefs, etc.) 
needed to adequately teach each lesson. This section also 
includes recommended non-printed media materials (TV/VCR, 
slides, etc.) to be used by the instructor, at his/her 
discretion. 
d. Instructional Outline 
The instructional outline section of each lesson 
provides an extensive framework of the instructional 
(premishap) material to be presented in each lesson. This 
framework furnishes the AMB instructor with the premishap 
topics, concepts, principles, techniques, and knowledge to 
be used while planning and delivering AMB training. 
Specifically, the four AMB lessons designed for the Aircraft 
Mishap Board training segment cover the following subjects: 
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AMB Lesson #1 
a. Overview of OPNAVINST 3750.6Q, The Naval Aviation 
Safety Program 
b. Concept of Privilege 
c. AMB Individual Mishap Responsibilities 
AMB Lesson #2 
a. AMB Individual Mishap Responsibilities Review 
b. Mishap Site Security 
c. Logistical Considerations 
d. Mishap Media Factors 
AMB Lesson #3 
a. Initial Mishap Site Walk-through 
b. Mishap Photography 
c. Witness Interviewing 
AMB Lesson #4 
a. Wreckage Diagrams 
b. Aircraft Impact Analysis 
c. Wreckage Pattern Evaluation 
d. Fire Analysis 
e. System Analysis Review 
e. Additional Instructional References 
This section of the four AMB lessons provides 
the AMB instructor with additional references relevant to 
the instructional outline material provided within each 
lesson. Reviewing these (optional) references will give the 
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AMB instructor a stronger knowledge and understanc. :1g of the 
instructional materials presented in the lesson. 
f. Helpful Notes 
This section provides the AMB instructor with 
additional beneficial information to consider when planning 
and delivering AMB lessons. These "notes" are obtained from 
the experiences (lessons learned) of several past Aviation 
Safety Officers and AMB Senior Members. This informat1on 1s 
only advisory in nature and is not required in the AMB 
instructional process. 
The combination of all six lesson elements 
provides the AMB instructor with a instructional format 
supplying: 1) why the instruction is taking place and what 
knowledge and/or performance is required upon completing the 
instruction; 2) how to conduct the instruction and what 
material is required to complete the instruction; and 3) 
what premishap instructional material/information needs to 
be taught. 
The AMB training lessons developed in this 
segment used primarily four instructional material 
references. These references are listed as follows: 
1. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Department of 
the Navy, OPNAVINST 3750.6Q, The Naval Aviation Safety 
Program, August 1989. 
2. Aviation Safety Programs, Naval Postgraduate School, 
Aircraft Mishap Investigation, June 1992. 
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3. Technical Manual Safety Investigation Volume I, USAF 
AFP 127-1, NAVAIR 00-80T-116-1, Mishap Investigation, 
May 1987. 
4. Technical Manual Safety Investigation Volume II, USAF 
AFP 127-1, NAVAIR 00-80T-116-2, Investigative 
Techniques, May 1987. 
C. SQUADRON DUTY OFFICE TRAINING 
1. Duty Office Overview 
There are, it seems, two separate crises to contend 
with when an aircraft mishap occurs. The first is to cope 
with the incident itself; coordinating Search and Rescue 
efforts and/or aircraft recovery, notifying all required 
personnel and organizations, and completing the essential 
voice and written reporting requirements. The second crisis 
is to deal with the aftermath of the mishap. Organizing the 
investigative effort, managing the flood of telephone calls 
from worried spouses, friends, and relatives, in addition to 
dealing with the press and the media. 
The Squadron Duty Office is normally the first 
squadron unit notified of an actual squadron mishap and is 
the squadron entity most likely to deal with both crises 
mentioned above. This unit, normally comprised of a 
Squadron Duty Officer (SDO)/Operations Duty Officer (ODO), 
an Assistant Squadron Duty Officer (ASDO) , and a Duty 
Driver, are key participants in the successful management of 
an aircraft mishap. This unit, particularly the Squadron 
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Duty Officer, needs to be extremely knowledgeable and well-
trained on the content, requirements, and scope of the 
Squadron Premishap Plan to effectively supervise this type 
of situation. However, because of the ever-changing 
composition of the unit, training these watch teams can be a 
remarkably difficult endeavor. Generally, the Squadron Duty 
Office is manned by rotating crews through the three "watch 
billets," (SDO, ASDO, and Duty Driver), or by randomly 
assigning qualified squadron personnel to these positions. 
Depending on the "watchbill" for any given month, the actual 
watch team composition could vary for every shift every day. 
This of course is a worst-case training scenario, but it 
does reveal the variability of the duty office watch team. 
It would be impossible for the Squadron Aviation 
Safety Officer to conduct duty office training everyday to 
account for this duty office variability. The ASO has 
numerous other safety and squadron-related responsibilit1es 
that require his/her attention. However, certain training 
techniques can be employed by the ASO to ensure effective 
and efficient premishap training of squadron duty office 
watch teams. This is accomplished in the duty office 
training segment by providing a specific example of an 
actual duty office watch team drill. The reader is taken 
through the appropriate steps of the exercise, in detail, to 
allow for complete comprehension of relevant duty office 
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watch team training and evaluation procedures and 
requirements. The design and development of this segment of 
the training program uses squadron safety personnel, in 
cooperation with the squadron Senior Watch Officer, to plan, 
administer, and evaluate the premishap plan knowledge and 
skills possessed by squadron duty office watch teams. An 
evaluation of the instructional format used in accomplis~ing 
this training follows. 
2. Instructional Format 
The principle method used in conducting duty office 
premishap training was developed in three distinct phases. 
These phases, listed in order of occurrence, are as follows: 
1. Self-instruction or self-study of the squadron 
premishap plan accomplished by the individu~~i squadron 
duty office watch teams. 
2. Evaluation of watch team premishap knowledge through 
duty office premishap simulations/"drills." 
3. Assessing the effectiveness and the comprehensiveness 
of both the squadron premishap plan and the squadron 
duty office training effort by examining simulation 
feedback. This simulation feedback consists of 
written evaluations that measure how well each duty 
office watch team compares to previously established 
premishap plan performance criteria. This phase 
provides a method to examine both the current squadron 
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premishap plan and the current duty office training 
strategy. The watch team evaluations will ident1fy 
current deficiencies in these areas and provide a 
method for reviewing and revising either the squadron 
premishap plan and/or the duty office training program. 
To further define the phases mentioned above, the 
duty office training segment was subsequently separated into 
a three-step process. This three-step process was developed 
to provide an easy-to-understand and an easy-to-use 
methodology for conducting useful duty office training. 
Specifically, this three-step process consists of the 
following: 
a. Duty Office Simulation Preparation 
This process step supplies techniques to promote 
self-instruction of the premishap plan by the squadron duty 
office watch teams. In addition, specific simulation 
planning and organizing information is provided in this 
section to assist the Squadron Safety Department in 
accomplishing duty office simulations/drills. This section 
also recommends the composition of the squadron simulation 
team: (minimum two members), one member to act as the 
simulation monitor (positioned in the duty office during the 
drill), and one member acting as the communications member 
(receiving all duty office phone communications and role-
?laying various preassigned characters) . The last 
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(optional) member serves as an information link (a runner) 
between the simulation monitor and the communications 
member. 
b. Conducting the Duty Office Simulation 
This section provides a step-by-step example of 
a duty office watch team simulation. This format gives a 
"generic" demonstration of the events and procedures 
encompassed in an actual duty office simulation. Preplanned 
simulation conditions are listed in addition to relevant 
simulation administration suggestions. 
c. Duty Office Assessment 
The Duty Office Assessment section provides 
simulation evaluation outlines to be used by the simulation 
monitor and the communication member in evaluating the 
squadron duty office drill. These evaluation outlines use 
standardized premishap plan criteria (taken from OPNAVINST 
3750.6Q and several Navy/Marine Corp premishap plans) as the 
basis for the assessments. In addition, management-based 
criteria are used in the assessments. Overall watch team 
performance as-well-as watch team premishap plan knowledge 
is assessed by the evaluations. 
The information provided in this segment of the 
"Squadron Premishap Training Program" provides the squadron 
Aviation Safety Officer and Squadron Safety Department with 
an easy-to-use instructional framework for preparing, 
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instructing, and evaluating the premishap knowledge and 
applied skills of the squadron's duty office watch teams. 
D. BASE-WIDE PREMISBAP SIMULATION TRAINING 
1. Base-Wide Simulation Background 
In the event of an actual aircraft mishap, numerous 
military and civilian departments, commands, and agencies, 
become involved. Prior specific mishap simulation training 
is necessary in order to properly coordinate, control, and 
supervise this confusing and demanding situation. In 
addition, aircraft mishap simulations allow the squadron and 
other base departments/commands the opportunity to verify 
the practicality and usefulness of their respective 
premishap/emergency preparedness plans. Premishap 
simulations however, provide not only a means to evaluate 
squadron, wing, and base premishap/emergency preparedness 
programs, but also provide a constructive, "hands-on" mishap 
training environment which provides and stimulates 
additional learning opportunities. This environment allows 
the airstation mishap participants to apply their previously 
learned mishap skills, knowledge, and techniques to a "real 
world", functional, and coordinated mishap scenario. It 
also allows these participants the opportunity to practice 
their actual mishap roles and responsibilities under unique 
"operational" conditions. Furthermore, premishap 
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simulations enable participants to meet and interact with 
one-another, building professional aff1liation and working 
relationships prior to an actual mishap incident. This 
prior affiliation can be vitally important to mishap command 
and coordination efforts during the initial chaotic moments 
following an actual aircraft mishap. Finally, these 
premishap exercises will allow the simulation participants 
the opportunity to thoroughly familiarize themselves with 
all airstation pre/post mishap-related facilities and 
services. 
The purpose of this section of the ''Squadron 
Premishap Training Program" is to provide guidance to assist 
the squadron safety department in planning, organizing, 
administering, and evaluating base-wide mishap simulations. 
In accomplishing this purpose the following two objectives 
are realized: 
1. The premishap simulation provides a verifiable 
means for the safety department to evaluate the 
thoroughness and effectiveness of previously 
administered Aircraft Mishap Board and Squadron Duty 
Office Watch Team training. 
2. The premishap simulation format also provides the 
instructional setting to transfer the knowledge 
proficiency gained in the classroom lectures into 
applied mishap performance skills. 
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2. Instructional Format 
The principle instructional method used in 
conducting base-wide simulation training was developed in 
four phases. These phases were designed to provide an 
unexperienced squadron Safety Department with a framework of 
procedures and guidance in performing base-wide mlshap 
simulations. The four instructional phases used in this 
segment are as follows: 
1. base-wide simulation planning, 
2. organizing the simulation, 
3. administering the simulation, and 
4. simulation evaluation. 
These sections use guidelines and information 
provided by Transport Canada and the Federal Aviation 
Administration. A brief outline of the specific topics 
addressed in each of these four sections is provided as 
follows: 
1. Base-wide Simulation Planning 
a. Definition of Participants 
b. Scope of the Exercise 
c. Procedures to be Taught and/or Exercised 
d. Controlling Organization 
e. Evaluators to be Present 
f. Format of Critiques 
64 
2. Organizing the Simulation 
a. Coordination of Participants 
b. Squadron Preparation 
3. Administering the Simulation 
a. Simulation Suggestions 
4. Simulation Evaluation 
a. Individual Unit Evaluation 
b. Squadron Debrief 
c. Segment Evaluation 
This segment of the "Squadron Premishap Training 
Program" provides sound guidance for squadron Safety 
Departments to apply before, during, and after the 
simulation exercise has taken place. Although not 
completely comprehensive in scope and content, this segment 
gives simulation planners the necessary infor•na~ion to 
effectively implement base-wide simulations 1.nto their 
individual squadron's Command Aviation Safety Program. 
E. IMPLEMENTATION GUIDELINES 
Implementing the three segments of the "Squadron 
Premishap Training Program" into the existing Command 
Aviation Safety Program is an important step in the 
instructional process. However, Naval aviation squadrons 
all have different administrative, training, and operational 
requirements that might preclude, delay, restrict, or limit 
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complete implementation of all segments of the training 
program. For this reason exact implementation of the 
"Squadron Premishap Training Program" is left to the 
discretion of each aviation command's safety department. 
Nevertheless, general implementation guidelines for the 
program are subsequently provided for squadron review and 
consideration. It is important to note that each segment of 
the premishap training program can be used independently as 
a "stand-alone program" or collectively as a comprehensive 
squadron premishap training program. 
1. AMB Training Segment 
WHAT? The four AMB instructional lessons 
WHO? The Squadron Aviation Safety Officer 
WHERE? Quiet, well-lit, and functional squadron 
working-space or office. 
HOW? As specified in the individual AMB 
lessons. However, this training format is 
predominately lecture-based. 
HOW OFTEN? Recommend one lesson every six weeks 
during the squadron at-home cycle. This 
will allow the AMB to complete the entire 
lesson series twice each year. AMB 
lessons -through-three take 
approx~ y 1.5 hours to complete. AMB 
lesson ~ takes approximately 2.0 hours 
to complete. 
2. Duty Office Training Segment 
WHAT? 
WHO? 
Duty Office Watch Team simulations/drills 
Aviation Safety Officer, Ground Safety 
Officer, and Aviation Safety Petty 
Officer (Simulation Team) . The ASO 
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serves as the Simulation Monitor, the GSO 
serves as the Communications M~~e~, 
and the ASPO to acts as the inforrnatlon 
runner. 
WHERE? Squadron Duty Office 
HOW? As specified in the Duty Office Training 
Program segment. 
HOW OFTEN? Recommend one drill every two weeks. This 
will allow the Safety Department to 
evaluate a good percentage of the 
squadron personnel assigned to duty 
office watch positions without 
overburdening the individuals conducting 
the simulations. Duty office 
simulations/drills should last between 
thirty minutes and one hour in length. 
3. Base-wide Premishap Simulations Segment 
WHAT? Base-wide simulations training 
WHO? Squadron-designated Simulation Planning 
Team, to include the Squadron Safety 
Officer, Aviation Safety Officer, Ground 
Safety Officer, Aviation Safety Petty 
Officer, and the Wing Safety Officer. 
WHERE? At horne and/or deployed/detached 
airfield. This program doesn't recommend 
conducting the full-scale simulation at a 
remotely located "outlying" facility 
until prior simulation experience is 
obtained by the squadron Safety 
Department. 
HOW? As specified in the Base-Wide Prernishap 
Simulations segment of the program. 
HOW OFTEN? At a minimum, one base-wide simulation 
should be conducted every year. If 
possible a simulation should be conducted 




F. BENEFITS OF IMPLEMENTATION 
The most obvious benefit to implementing the "Squadron 
Premishap Training Program" into Naval aviation squadrons is 
the increase in squadron premishap knowledge and readiness 
this program will generate. By providing a functional 
training vehicle for aviation safety departments to use in 
managing their respective Command Aviation Safety Programs, 
this thesis will increase the level and quality of premishap 
information retained by safety-critical squadron personnel. 
The outcomes to this training process will include: 1) an 
increase in the quality of mishap investigations and mishap 
reporting performed by squadron AMBs, 2) improved squadron 
duty office watch team efficiency and effectiveness in 
managing mishap crises, and 3) greater understanding and 
comprehension of pre/post mishap "safety-awareness" issues 
realized by all squadron personnel. All of these outcomes 
result in an increased ability for Naval aviation commands 
to eliminate aviation hazards thus preserving the human and 
material resources required to accomplish naval aviation 
missions--the purpose and the objective of "The Naval 
Aviation Safety Program." Helping to prevent one additional 
injury or even perhaps saving one or more lives, is the 
greatest possible benefit from implementing this program. 
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G. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The methodology used in researching, designing, and 
developing the "Squadron Premishap Training Program" relied 
heavily on the first three phases of the ISD model 
referenced in NAVEDTRA 110A. These phases; analysis, 
design, and development were incorporated and utilized in 
the training program's formulation. The fourth phase, 
implementation, initially commenced in March, 1994. Five 
Navy and Marine Corp Aviation Safety Officers were given a 
copy of the "Squadron Premishap Training Program" to 
~ 
incorporate into their Command Aviation Safety Programs. 
The fifth phase of the process, evaluation/control was not 
incorporated into the instructional process. A follow-on 
thesis could utilize the information developed in this 
thesis and complete the instructional systems development 
process by thoroughly conducting the implementation and 
evaluation phases of the model. 
Future analysis should be completed to assess the 
validity and success of the "Squadron Premishap Training 
Program." A follow-on thesis could examine and report on 
the measurable premishap knowledge, performance abilities, 
and attitudinal and behavioral changes resulting from 
implementation of the "Squadron Premishap Training Program." 
Evaluation and validation is a necessary step in determining 
the overall significance of the training program. 
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APPENDIX A. SQUADRON PREMISBAP TRAINING PROGRAM 
SQUADRON PREMISHAP TRAINING 
PROGRAM 
A-1 AMB TRAINING SEGMENT 
A-2 DUTY OFFICE WATCH TEAM TRAINING 
SEGMENT 
A-3 BASE-WIDE PREMISHAP SIMULATIONS 
TRAINING SEGMENT 
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Appendiz A-1. AMB TRAINING SEGMENT 
Aircraft Mishap Board 
Training Segment 
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AMB LESSON I 1 
1. 1 OBJECTIVES 
1.11 Given OPNAVINST 3750.6Q, be able to define a naval 
aircraft mishap and locate the purpose, objective{s), 
and program concepts of the Naval Aviation Safety 
Program. 
1.12 Given OPNAVINST 3750.6Q, be able to discuss the 
general content of chapters 1-7. 
1.13 Given a list of examples, be able to identify the 
correct and incorrect uses of privileged information, 
in accordance with OPNAVINST 3750.6Q. 
1.14 Given a list of specific AMB responsibilities, be able 
to verbally explain and demonstrate the performance of 
these duties. 
1 • 2 OVERVIEW 
This is the first in a set of four AMB lessons 
developed to provide mishap training for the squadron 
Aircraft Mishap Board. The purpose of this first lesson is 
to: 1) familiarize the AMB with the general design and 
content of OPNAVINST 3750.6Q, THE NAVAL AVIATION SAFETY 
PROGRAM, 2) to discuss the concept of privilege as it 
applies to mishap investigation and reporting, and 3) 
discuss, in-depth, the Aircraft Mishap Board members initial 
aircraft mishap procedures and specific responsibilities. 
The OPNAVINST 3750.6Q review will explain the purpose 
and objectives of both the Naval Aviation Safety Program and 
the squadron designated Aircraft Mishap Board. In addition, 
using OPNAVINST 3750.6Q as a reference, the concept of 
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privilege, as it applies to mishap 1nvest1gating and 
reporting, will be defined and discussed. Finally, because 
the first twenty-four hours directly following an aircraft 
mishap is generally the most critical and the most chaotic 
for an Aircraft Mishap Board, the initial recommended AMB 
member responsibilities (those duties occurring within the 
first twenty-four hours) are addressed. Discussion will 
cover each member's AMB assignments in detail to facilitate 
tota~- group comprehension of all required AMB duties and 
responsibilities. Many cf these dut1es, for example, mishap 
site security, mishap photography, and witness interviewing, 
will be discussed individually and in greater detail, in the 
following three AMB lessons. This first AMB lesson should 
establish the initial foundation for subsequent premishap 
instruction to build on and develop. 
1 • 3 
1 • 31 
1. 32 
INSTRUCTIONAL AIDS 
The Naval Aviation Safety Program, OPNAVINST 375C.6Q 
AMB member folders, each containing a list of required 
AMB duties and responsibilities (described and listed 
in Section 1.4) 
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1.4 INSTRUCTIONAL OUTLINE 
I. Overview of OPNAVINST 3750.69 
A. Discuss the Purpose of the Naval Aviation Safety 
Program [OPNAVINST 3750.6Q paragraph 102] 
B. Discuss the Objective(s) of the Naval Aviation 
Safety Program [OPNAVINST 3750.6Q paragraph 103] 
C. Define and Discuss 3750.6Q Program Concepts 
[OPNAVINST 3750.6Q paragraph 105] 
1. Define damage and injury, 
2. Define hazards, 
3. Define hazard detection and elimination. 
D. Define and Discuss The Concept of Privilege 
[OPNAVINST 3750.6Q paragraph 105e] 
1. Review the list of improper uses of privileged 
information, provided in OPNAVINST 3750.6Q, pg 
1-5. 
2. Discuss the purpose and rationale of designating 
information as privileged (paragraph 105e(2/3)). 
3. Discuss the protection of privileged 
information (paragraph 105e(4)). 
E. Discuss AMB Composition and Utilization [OPNAVINST 
3750.6Q paragraph 105c1b, 206] 
F. Briefly Discuss the Principal Focus of OPNAVINST 
3750.6Q, Chapters 1-7 (use the Table of Contents as 
a guide for this general review) . 
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II. AMB Member Responsibilities 
A. Senior Member 
1. Proceed t0 the Squadron Duty Office. Upon 
arriving, confirm that the initial actions 
required in the premishap plan have been 
initiated and/or completed. 
Specifically: 
a. Oprep 3 voice and written messages, 
b. Recall of necessary personnel, 
c. Chain-of-Command notification. 
2. Meet and provide direction for squadron AMB 
members. 
a. Are All members present? If not, appoint 
other AMB members to divide and complete 
their duties. 
3. Organize security for mishap site. 
4. Ensure logistics issues are resolved. 
a. What transportation is needed? 
b. Are communications established with and for 
the mishap site? 
c. Where is the nearest phone and working area 
in reference to the mishap site? 
d. Has an on-base AMB working/deliberation area 
been established? 
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5. Contact and brief base/mishap assigned 
photographer. 
6. Function as sole "central" mishap information 
source. 
a. Was it an on-base mishap? Inform base and 
wing commander's office of this function. 
b. Was it an off-base mishap? Inform controlling 
custodian's public affairs office of this 
function. 
B. Aviation Safety Officer 
1. If able, proceed to mishap site, otherwise 
proceed to the squadron duty office. 
2. Ensure survivors and/or remains are initially 
being cared for. 
3. Control and brief as necessary the on-site 
security personnel. 
a. Establish single access point to mishap site, 
b. Require Senior Member or ASO approval for 
personnel access into mishap area. 
4. Ensure mishap area is secure/safe for 
investigation. 
a. Approval from Explosive Ordinance Disposal 
(EOD) , 
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b. Approval from Fire Department Chief, 
c. Approval from local authorities, if required. 
5. Mishap site logistical considerations. 
a. Ensure a Corpsman is always on-scene if the 
Flight Surgeon is working elsewhere, 
b. Coordinate mishap site survey, 
c. Brief photographer on specific photo 
requirements and on mishap site safety 
precautions. 
6. Locate witnesses and coordinate witness 
interviews and statements. Conduct witness 
interviews as necessary. 
C. Operations Member 
1. Proceed to the squadron Duty Office. 
2. Collect and securely stow all flightcrew 
records. Specifically: 
a. Training records, 
b. NATOPS jackets, 
c. Flightcrew logbooks, and 
d. Service records. 
3. Collect and securely stow all mission related 
records and documents. Specifically: 
a. Duty Officer's original flight schedule, 
b. Flight plan, 
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c. Weather brief, 
d. Aircraft manifest, 
e. Travel orders, and 
f. Mission briefing guide. 
4. Collect and securely stow other miscellaneous 
items and documents. Specifically: 
a. Weather report covering mishap time-frame, 
b. Tower radar and voice tapes, 
c. FAA/ARTCC radar and voice tapes, and 
d. Current NATOPS and OPNAVINST 3710.7M. 
5. Assist Senior Member and ASO as directed. 
D. Maintenance Member 
1. Proceed to the squadron Duty Office. 
2. Col~ect and securely stow all aircraft records. 
Specifically: 
a. Aircraft logbooks, 
b. Engine logbooks, 
c. Aircraft discrepancy book (ADB), 
d. Applicable workcenter VIDS and MAF records, 
e. Weight and balance information, 
f. Aircraft servicing records, and 
g. Fuel, oil, and hydraulic samples. 
3. Assist Senior Member as directed. 
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E. Flight Surgeon 
1. If survivors: proceed to the location of the 
survivors. 
a. Make examinations, 
b. Take medical samples, and 
c. Obtain written statements when feasible. 
2. If no survivors: proceed to the locat1on of the 
remains. 
a. Take medical samples and 
b. Coordinate with local coroner and AFIP for 
autopsy. 
3. If survivors unknown: proceed to the mishap 
site. 
4. Follow guidelines provided in the Flight 
Surgeon's Aircraft Mishap Investigations Pocket 
Checklist. 
Note: An autopsy is required for all fatalities 
resulting from a mishap. AFIP (Armed Forces 
Institute of Pathology) provides the technical 
expertise to provide important clues from injury 
patterns such as which pilot was at the 
controls, etc. [Reference OPNAVINST 3750.6Q 
paragraph 607c(2)] 
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1.5 ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONAL REFERENCES 
1.51 Technical Manual Safetv Investigation. Volume I, 
NAVAIR 00-80T-116-1, 1987, Chapters 4 & 6. 
1.6 HELPFUL NOTES 
A. When preparing AMB member to-do folders, make two 
(2) folders for each position. This allows the 
member use of one folder and gives the ASO a folder 
to be distributed in the event of a mishap, just in 
case an AMB member misplaces the original folder. 
In addition, provide a copy of all member duties 
within each AMB member folder. 
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AMB LESSON 12 
2.1 OBJECTIVES 
2.11 Verbally describe from memory, the two primary reasons 
for employing mishap site security assets. 
2.12 Given a Site Security Briefing Checklist, be able to 
thoroughly brief security forces on required mishap 
security responsibilities. 
2.13 Given mishap site environmental conditions, be able to 
prepare personal and professional supplies appropriate 
to work in this environment. 
2.14 Given a field mishap kit, be able to identify all 
items contained within the kit and verbally explain 
their use. 
2.15 Given a list of alternatives, be able to identify the 
correct interaction procedures, restrictions, and uses 
of the news media, in accordance with NAVAIR 00-SOT-
116-1. 
2.2 OVERVIEW 
The purpose of this lesson is to address mishap site-
security issues, logistical considerations including a 
hands-on inventory of the squadron mishap kit, and to 
provide specific guidance for interacting and utilizing the 
local news media. In addition, this lesson will provide a 
review of the initial AMB member responsibilities discussed 
in lesson one. Aircraft Mishap Board questions relating to 
these duties should be addressed in order to ensure complete 
understanding of these requisite procedures. This lesson, 
and the two AMB lessons to follow, will address topics, 
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methods, and principles specific to the aircraft mishap 
investigation process. Examining the individual segments of 
the investigative process will facil1tate greater AMB 
understanding of these critical aspects of mishap 
investigation. AMB participation in lesson discussion is 
highly encouraged. 
The use of specific media devices (photographic slides, 
overhead transparencies, etc.,) to use in presenting lesson 
lecture material is left to the discretion of the course 
instructor. 
2.3 INSTRUCTIONAL AIDS 
2.31 Technical Manual Safety Investigation Volume I, NAVAIR 
00-SOT-116-1 
2.32 Aircraft Mishap Board member folders 
2.33 Mishap Site Security Briefing Checklist; Appendix B-1 
2.34 Squadron Field Mishap Kit 
90 
2.4 INSTRUCTIONAL OUTLINE 
I. Aircraft Mishap Board Actions Review 
A. Review the Mishap Duties and Responsibilities of 
each AMB member; list is contained in AMB member 
folders. 
B. Discuss any questions concerning these 
requirements. 
II. Mishap Site Security 
A. Define the Purpose of Mishap Site Security [NAVAIR 
00-SOT-116-1 paragraph 3-10] 
1. Preservation of the evidence--the location of 
pieces of wreckage, their position on the 
ground, and their appearance, may be vital clues 
to the cause of the mishap. 
2. Safeguard Naval property and classified 
information. 
3. Prevent further injury--denying access to the 
mishap site to prevent additional injuries. The 
potential hazards at a mishap site are numerous. 
B. Interference With the Wreckage [NAVAIR 00-SOT-116-1 
paragraph 2-71 
1. List reasons when aircraft parts and components 
may be moved: 
a. Rescuing the injured, 
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b. Preventing or minimizing f~re damage to 
wreckage, 
c. Removing wreckage obstructing essential 
disaster response vehicles or mishap 
essential vehicles, 
d. Recovering salvageable wreckage or 
components from an aircraft in the water, 
e. Safing weapons, pyrotechnics, etc., fitted 
to or carried in the aircraft, 
f. Dealing with hazardous substances. 
C. Safety at the Mishap Site [NAVAIR 00-SOT-116-1 
paragraph 3-3,3-4,7-2] 
1. Explain what actions need to occur prior to the 
Senior Member assuming mishap on-scene command: 
a. Extinguished fire, 
b. Removal or location of all survivors, 
c. Clearance from on-scene Fire Chief, 
d. Approval from explosive ordinance disposal. 
NOTE: AMB work should commence after disaster 
response phase ends. 
2. Discuss the possible hazards at the mis~ap 
site: 
a. Munitions--ordnance, CADS, flares, etc., 
b. ?ressure vessels--oxygen, co·, landing 
gear, 
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c. Flammables and toxins--batter1es, fluids, 
d. Composite materials--[Reference NAVSAFECEN 
message, Aircraft Mishap Investigation, pg 
17] 1 
e. Sharp metal pieces and broken glass, 
f. Natural hazards--sunburn, poison ivy, 
snakes. 
NOTE: All personnel at mishap site should be 
briefed on these hazards prior to commencing 
site operations (See Appendix B-2). Also, 
always ensure a corpsman is on-site for 
possible investigation-related injuries. 
D. Discuss Establishing Mishap Site Security Forces 
[NAVAIR 00-SOT-116-1 paragraph 2-8,6-6] 
1. Site security for an on-base mishap: 
a. Utilize base police, squadron personnel, 
etc., 
b. Armed guards can be authorized by Base c.o. 
2. Site security for an off-base mishap: 
a. Coordinate with local law enforcement 
agencies, 
b. Support effort with nearest base security 
forces, 
c. If there is a possibility of classified 
material at the crash site, the site may be 
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declared a National Defense Area (NDA) . If 
an NDA has been declared, posted, and 
marked, "reasonable force" can be used to 
prevent entry into the area. 
Note: Check with local JAG and security police to 
define "reasonable force." 
3. Security personnel at the m~shap site: 
a. Number of personnel needed is determined by 
the mishap area size and number of shifts 
required, 
b. Briefing--personnel assigned to guard 
wreckage need to be briefed on site security 
requirements. 
Note: Reference Site Security Briefing Checklist 
listed in Appendix B-1. 
III. Logistics 
A. Discuss Transportation Issues 
1. Utilize Base Transportation Office and Base 
Operations assets for vehicles, mishap site-
transportation, or other transportation issues. 
2. If the crash site is remotely located enlist 
the assistance of other commands and agencies 
(Helicopter squadron, Reserve Unit, etc.). 
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B. Address Communications Issues [NAVAIR 00-80T-116-1 
paragraph 6-15b] 
1. Radios--appropriate several two-way hand held 
radios. Mishap vehicles should be two-way 
radio equipped. 
2. Obtain cellular phones ~f possible. Contact 
Base Operations or Base Electronics for 
assistance. 
3. Hammer Ace--lightweight, portable 
communication system for remote-s~te secure 
communications. 
Note: Hammer Ace is available 24 hours a day. 
Contact HQ AFCC/XORCP, Command Post, Scott 
AFB IL, A/V 576-2591, COMM (618)256-2591. 
C. Discuss Personal and Professional Supply 
Considerations [NAVAIR 00-80T-116-1 paragraph 4-
84,85,86, 6-15c] 
1. Personal supplies--working gloves are 
essential equipment. Pack clothing appropriate 
for the environment (terrain, temperature, 
vegetation, precipitation, etc.). 
Note: NAVAIR 00-80T-116-1 paragraphs 4-85 and 4-86 
provide a list of recommended investigator 
survival items. Also, survival equipment may 
be available through Base Supply. 
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2. Field Mishap Kit [Aviat~on Safety Programs, 
Aircraft Mishap Investigation, Appendix A] 
a. Display mishap kit and discuss its contents. 
Note: Recommended Field Mishap Kit inventory is 
included in above reference, page A-2. 
Additional materials may be included in the 
mishap kit as required. 
IV. News Media 
A. Discuss the Function of the Public Affairs Off~cer 
[NAVAIR 00-SOT-116-1 paragraphs 2-9, 3-9, 3-21] 
1. Establishes single point of contact for news 
media, which initially releases senior member 
of these duties. 
2. Minimizes public reaction to a mishap by 
providing timely, well developed information to 
the media. 
3. Informs public of current Navy prevention and 
safety measures as well as information 
concerning the mishap. 
B. Discuss Board Member Interaction with the Press 
1. Never speculate about the cause of a mishap. 
2. If pressed by a reporter, explain that only a 
mishap board is qualified to determine the 
cause. 
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3. Refer all specific mishap questions to the PAO 
or Senior Member for comment. 
C. Address the Cautions Concerning the Media at the 
Mishap Site (NAVAIR 00-BOT-116-1 paragraph 3-9] 
1. Unauthorized photography, publication, or 
possession of classified information by the 
media. 
2. Premature release of survivor/fatality 
information by the media. 
3. The media can physically interfere with the 
mishap investigations effort. 
D. Address the Helpful Applications of the Media 
1. Providing initial photographs of the crash site 
prior to the AMB's arrival. 
2. Identifying and contacting witnesses, and 
amateur photographers who may have valuable 
testimony or photographs/video related to the 
mishap. 
3. Recovering parts that have b~en removed from 
the crash site or found elsewhere by requesting 
public assistance through news releases. 
Note: Aviation Safety Programs, Senior Member 
Guide, contains initial recommended media 
release information and guidance. 
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2.5 ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONAL REFERENCES 
2.51 Technical Manual Safety Investigation, Volume I, 
NAVAIR 00-80T-116-1, 1987, Chapters 2-4, 6. 
2.6 HELPFUL NOTES 
A. Include a Si~e Security Checklist, Appendix B-1, in 
the AMB member folders. Also, inventory the f~eld 
mishap kit for completeness prior to conducting 
lesson 2 instruction. 
B. Coordinate with Base Operations, Base Supply, Base 
Security, and Base Transportation to verify what 
level of assistance, on-base and off-base, they 
can provide given a squadron mishap. 
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AMB LESSON I 3 
3. 1 OBJECTIVES 
3.11 Given a list of acceptable and unacceptable 
investigation situations, be able to identify the 
"Do's and Don'ts," and select the correct 
investigation practices. 
3.12 Given a defined naval aircraft mishap, be able to 
present an overview of the steps taken by the AMB 
during the initial walk-through phase of a mishap 
investigation, in accordance with NAVAIR 00-SOT-116-1. 
3.13 Given a defined naval aircraft mishap, be able to 
determine what physical evidence at the mishap site 
needs to be photographed in accordance with NAVAIR 00-
SOT-116-1. 
3.14 Given mishap photographs containing privileged 
information, be able to examine and use these 
photographs in accordance with OPNAVINST J750.6Q. 
3.15 Given a defined naval aircraft mishap, be able list 
the resources available for use in locating potential 
mishap witnesses. 
3.16 Given an Advice to Witnesses statement, be able to 
conduct mishap witness interviews in accordance with 
OPNAVINST 3750.6Q and NAVAIR 00-SOT-116-1. 
3.2 OVERVIEW 
The purpose of this lesson is to provide an 
introduction to the AMB investigations process. This lesson 
begins by explaining the process of the initial mishap site 
walk-through. By referencing the Mishap Do's and Don'ts 
Brief, acceptable and unacceptable conduct at the mishap 
site is reviewed. These investigative practices, taken from 
NAVAIR 00-SOT-116-1, are additionally listed in Appendix B-
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2. The reasons for the walk-through and the techniques 
utilized during this phase of the investigation will be 
addressed. In addition, detailed discussion relat1ng to 
mishap photography, as well as witness interviewing will be 
examined. Photography is useful to the mishap investigation 
because it provides a tool for the investigators, supplies 
documentation of the mishap, and it educates people who 
could not observe the mishap scene first-hand. Witness 
interviews and associated techniques need to be discussed 
because interviewing is one of the most difficult and least 
understood tasks of an investigating board. Witnesses can 
provide valuable mishap information, but if the interview is 
improperly handled, this information may be lost or 
incorrectly presented. 
This lesson should provide the AMB members with the 
necessary knowledge and techniques to perform an initial 
site walk-through, effectively manage the photography effort 
at a mishap site, and perform written and verbal witness 
interviews. The initial site walk-through, mishap 
photography, and witness interviewing are all critical 
elements in the mishap investigations process and should be 
treated accordingly. In presenting these issues, put forth 
the required time and energy to fully explain and explore 
the details pertaining to these issues. The quality and 
effectiveness of potential mishap investigations coulc ~ely 
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on this detailed, prior training. The next lesson, lesson 
four, will address specific mishap site analysis and f1eld 
investigation techniques. 
3.3 INSTRUCTIONAL AIDS 
3.31 Technical Manual Safety Investigation Volume I, NAVAIR 
00-BOT-116-1 
3.32 Aircraft Mishap Board member folders 
3.33 Investigation Do's and Don'ts Brief; Appendix B-2 
3.34 Television, VCR, and Video Tape of Witness 
Interviewing Techniques (optional; refer to Helpful 
Notes) 
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3.4 INSTRUCTIONAL OUTLINE 
I. Initial Mishap Site Walk-Through 
A. Discuss Prewalk-Through Considerations [NAVAIR 
00-SOT-116-1 paragraph 6-14] 
1. Review Investigation Do's and Don'ts Brief 
[Appendix B-2] 
B. Discuss Process of Initial Walk-Through [NAVAIR 
00-SOT-116-1 paragraph 7-3f] 
1. Start from the initial impact point. ObseLve 
the wreckage distribution and terrain. Make 
notes or tape record initial impressions about 
site. 
2. Conduct a general inventory of the aircraft. 
Locate all major aircraft components to 
determine whether the aircraft was intact at 
impact. 
3. Carefully tag and identify all parts easily 
identifiable; this will provide a basic wreckage 
pattern. 
4. Do not disturb or remove any wreckage unless 
necessary. 
5. Attempt to recover the flight data recorder (if 
available). Before removing it from the site, 
document its position and physical condition. 
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6. Be alert for objects that are not part of the 
aircraft. A foreign object in the aircraft 
could be the cause or a causal factor related to 
the mishap. 
7. Protect all physical evidence from further 
damage. Edges of broken surfaces should be 
covered and kept away from contaminants such as 
fuel, oil, etc. 
8. Check all cockpit controls, selectors, switches, 
and handles; note and photograph their 
positions. Note and photograph the undisturbed 
readings of all instruments and indicators. Do 
not change settings or position of _ y control, 
switch, dial, or other component. Aircraft 
settings and configuration upon impact provide 
important investigation information. 
9. Recover and protect any evidence likely to 
disappear or change with time. Wreckage and 
ground scars should not be disturbed until all 
necessary evidence is gathered. Photograph 
evidence before disturbing its position. Fluid 
samples, fire debris, soot patterns, and light 
bulbs are examples of evidence that may be lost 
with time. 
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II. Mishap Site Photography 
A. Discuss Mishap Site Photographic Requirements 
[NAVAIR 00-SOT-116-1 paragraph 7-9, Chapter 9] 
1. The photographer--usually the squadron or base 
photographer. An Experienced photographer but 
probably not experienced with mishap 
photographic requirements. An AMB member shr -4 
always accompany and supervise the photogra~ 
effort. Insist that the photographer use color 
film for mishap photos! 
2. Photographic phases and priorities--shoot 
perishable photos first i.e., burning wreckage, 
fire pattern. At a minimum shoot the following 
items: 
a. Aerial view of mishap site, 
b. Overall mishap site from ground level, 
c. Impact marks, 
d. Cockpit switches and controls, 
e. Aircrew remains prior to removal, 
f. Major aircraft components, 
g. Suspect parts, as they are identified, 
h. Wreckage, prior to removal, 
i. Property damage, 
j. AMB analysis and reconstruction efforts. 
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Note: Prints and negatives of deceased need to be 
transferred to the AMB medical member. 
[Reference OPNAVINST 3750.6Q paragraph 717, 
pp. 7-14] 
B. Address AMB Directed Photographic Techniques 
1. The photographer should handle the general 
photo techniques while the AMB provides photo 
guidance for framing, perspective, detail, and 
location. 
2. Overshoot and underprint--its always better to 
have an excess of photographic evidence. Film 
is cheap, printing is the expensive part! 
3. Start from an overall perspective and work to 
the closeup or reconstruction. 
4. Use a ruler or color scale for size comparison. 
When available, compare a good part with the 
bad part in the same photo. 
5. Utilize a studio whenever possible, especially 
for photographs of specific detail or 
photos requiring different views or angles. 
6. Record on a notebook, tape-recorder, or placard 




Note: If you can locate prior (old) mishap 
investigation photographs depicting these 
techniques, show them to the AMB while you 
discuss these topics. 
C. Discuss Privileged Photos v. Non-Privileged Photos 
[OPNAVINST 3750.6Q paragraph 709, 717] 
1. Examples of privileged photographs: 
a. Autopsy photographs of numan remains, 
b. AMB staged photographs, 
c. AMB comparison photographs, 
d. Photographs showing AMB deliberation. 
Note: Captions and markings placed on photographs 
that are indicative of the AMB's 
deliberative process are privileged. The 
captions and markings only, not the 
photographs themselves. 
2. Examples of non-privileged photographs: 
a. Evidence as it is found in the field, even if 
it clearly shows a possible causal factor, 
b. Photographs generated by NADEP for 
engineering investigations, etc., 
c. All other photographs not mentioned above. 
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III. Witness Interviews 
A. Discuss the Purpose of Interviewing and Types of 
Witnesses [NAVAIR 00-80T-116-1 paragraph 8-2, 8-7] 
1. The AMB interviews mishap witnesses for three 
basic reasons: 
a. Find out what the witness knows, 
b. Establish preliminary causal factors, 
c. Complement other investigation phases. 
2. Three basic classifications of witnesses: 
a. The participant; person actually involved 
the mishap. 
b. The observer; person not actively involved 
the mishap but was present at the time of 
occurrence. 
c. The expert; someone who possess expert 
technical knowledge critical for AMB 
deliberations. 





c. Tower personnel, line maintenance personnel, 
runway duty officer, etc., 
d. Background, character witnesses (family, 
friends) , 
e. Civilians in the vicinity of the mishap. 
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B. Address Locating Witnesses and Witness Tim1ng 
Issues [NAVAIR 00-80T-116-1 paragraph 8-4,6,8] 




The witnesses memory of the mishap can 
diminish over time, 
The witnesses story m1ght change after 
comparing accounts with another witness, 
Aircrew statements should be taken as 
possible, with consideration for their 
physical and mental condition. 
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2. Locating witnesses: 
a. Interview witnesses currently at the mishap 
site, 
b. Use the media, local police force, ATC, and 
known witnesses to locate additional 
witnesses. 
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c. Discuss Witness Interviewing Techniques [NAVAIR 00-
80T-116-1 par~graphs 8-10 through 8-22] 
1. Setting the atmosphere for the interview: 
a. Set the witness at ease; offer them coffee, 
soda, etc. 
b. Revisit the scene of the mishap; puts the 
witness back in the same element as when the 
mishap occurred. Also works as a memory 
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enhancer, supporting retr~eval of mishap 
events. 
c. Conduct the interview in a quiet, non-
threatening room, (if unable to revisit the 
scene). 
2. Conducting the interview: 
a. Inform the witness of the concept of 
privilege, 
b. Inform the witness that you desire to record 
the interview, 
c. Let the witness start at a point in time well 
before the mishap. Let them talk all the way 
through the mishap without interruption. 
Witnesses should be encouraged to tell all 
they know about the mishap in their own 
words. Don't lead the witness through the 
interview. 
d. Ask questions after both you and the witness 
listen to the taping of the initial story. 
Keep the questions simple going from general 
questions to specific questions. 
e. Conclude the interview by asking, "Can you 
think of anything else we haven't covered?" 
Be courteous and end the interview by 
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providing the witness with your phone number 
and address for additional information that 
might be recalled at a later t~me. 
Note: NAVAIR 00-SOT-116-1 paragraph 8-21 provides 
specific interviewing techniques that should 
be reviewed prior to conducting an interview. 
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3.5 ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONAL REFERENCES 
3.51 Technical Manual Safety Investiaation, Volume I, 
NAVAIR 00-80T-116-1, 1987, Chapters 7-9. 
3.52 Aircraft Mishap Investigation, Aviation Safety 
Programs, Lessons 4 & 5. 
3.53 Aircraft Mishap Witness Interviewing Techniques, LCDR 
D.J. Thorn, NAVSAFCEN, reproduced in Aviation Safety 
Programs, Aircraft Mishap Investigations, page 45. 
3.6 HELPFUL NOTES 
A. As mentioned above, if you can locate prior mishap 
photographs to show to the AMB members during the 
photographic portion of the lecture, this will 
provide strong visual reinforcement of lecture 
material. 
B. Time permitting, conduct several mock witness 
interviews among the AMB members. If you have the 
ambition and have access to video equipment you 
could create your cwn witness interviewing video 
for the AMB's use. This media format will prov1de a 
self-edited and well-structured witness 
interviewing tool. 
C. NAVAIR 00-80T-116-1 paragraph 8-12 provides a list 
of recommended interviewer items (interview kit). 
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AMB LESSON I 4 
4 • 1 OBJECTIVES 
4.11 Given a defined naval aircraft mishap, be able to 
constr~ct and analyze a mishap wreckage diagram in 
accordance with NAVAIR 00-SOT-116-1/2. 
4.12 Given a defined naval aircraft mishap, be able to 
determine from the physical evidence at the mishap 
site, aircraft speed, direction, configuration, 
aircraft attitude, and angle of impact, at the time of 
th~ mishap, in accordance with NAVAIR 00-SOT-116-2. 
4.13 Given a defined naval aircraft mishap, be able to 
determine from the wreckage pattern at the mishap 
site, if an in-flight structural failure occurred 
and/or what was the aircraft's condition of flight at 
impact. 
4.14 Given a defined naval aircraft mishap in which there 
is evidence of fire, be able to distinguish between 
in-flight fire and ground fire, as defined in NAVAIR 
00-SOT-116-2. 
4.15 Given a defined naval aircraft mishap and NAVAIR 00-
SOT-116-1/2 as a reference, be able to examine and 
analyze air~raft systems and components to determine 
their role as a causal factcr in t.he mishap. 
4 • 2 OVERVIEW 
This is the last in a set of four AMB lessons developed 
to provide relevant mishap training for the squadron 
Aircraft Mishap Board. The purpose of this lesson is to 
introduce the concepts and principles associated with 
conducting mishap field investigations to the Aircraft 
Mishap Board. Initially, the use and development of 
wreckage diagrams is discussed. Wreckage diagrams are a 
valuable investigation tool because they provide information 
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that helps to determine if the aircraft's lmpact with the 
ground is related to the mishap (aircraft might have 
impacted the ground as a result of ... ), or if there is some 
question about the survivability of the accident. Aircraft 
impact determination techniques are also discussed in this 
lesson. Determining the speed, direction, attitude, 
configuration, and aircraft impact angle at the time of the 
mishap, can be critical information in determining mishap 
cause. Additionally, field investigation fire analysis and 
wreckage pattern evaluation methods are addressed in this 
lesson. Fire analysis provides a means of verifying whether 
an in-flight fire existed prior to the mishap or if the fire 
was just a result of the aircraft impacting the ground. 
Mishap wreckage pattern evaluation provides set procedures 
for examining and evaluating the aircraft's condition of 
flight at the time of impact. Determining whether the 
aircraft crashed due to an in-flight structural failure or 
was in a spin, stall, or inverted flight condition at the 
ti:r:e of impact can all be valuable clues in identifying the 
cause of the mishap. Finally, the lesson concludes by 
briefly reviewing NAVAIR 00-SOT-116-2. This review provides 
a brief description of the specific topics contained within 
this reference. Specific system and component analysis 
training is not provided in this AMB lesson set but is 
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highly encouraged if additional AMB training time is 
available. NAVAIR 00-SOT-116-1/2 provides all the technical 
information required to accomplish this training. 
4.3 INSTRUCTIONAL AIDS 
4.31 Technical Manual Safety Investigation Volumes I & II, 
NAVAIR 00-SOT-116-1/2 
4.32 Aircraft Mishap Board member folders 
4.33 Wreckage Diagrams (specific diagram examples are 
provided in Aviation Safety Programs, Aircraft Mishap 
Investigation, pages 53-56) 
4.34 Type Model of Squadron Aircraft (refer to Helpful 
Notes) 
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4.4 INSTRUCTIONAL OUTLINE 
I. Wreckaqe Diaqrama 
A. Discuss the Purpose of Wreckage Diagrams [NAVAIR 
00-SOT-116-1 paragraph 4-23; Diagramming The 
Wreckage Scene, by Richard H. Wood] 
1. Determine if all aircraft parts are accounted 
for. 
2. Determine if the aircraft was in controlled or 
uncontrolled flight at the time of impact. (This 
is discussed further in the next section.) 
3. Determine the path and the origin of an aircraft 
in-flight fire. 
4. Assist in in-flight aircraft structural failure 
reconstruction. 
5. Determine how aircraft came together (collided) 
in a mid-air situation. 
Note: Aerial photographs and large scale maps may 
be used in conjunction with or as an 
alternative to wreckage diagrams. 
B. Discuss the Types of Wreckage Diagrams [Aviation 
Safety Programs, Aircraft Mishap Investigation, 
pages 51-56) 
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1. ASO rough draft--an initial rough diagram to be 
used by the AMB until a formal AMB, public works 
or military surveyor diagram is completed [pg. 
53] . 
2. Polar wreckage diagram--used for high angle of 
impact mishaps (greater than 45 deg.), a 
circular style diagram [pg. 54]. 
3. Teardrop wreckage diagram--used for low angle 
of impact mishaps (less than 45 deg.), a center 
reference-line diagram [pg. 55]. 
4. Grid wreckage diagram--used in dense, or 
extremely large mishap areas [pg. 56]. 
Note: Diagram examples, in addition to diagram 
plotting and sketching instructions, are 
provided on the reference pages provided 
above. Also refer to additional 
instructional reference 4.51. 
C. Examine the Information Included on a Standard 
Wreckage Diagram [Aircraft Mishap Investigation, 
page 52] 
1. Apparent flight path direction, 
2. Magnetic north orientation, 
3. Landmarks and topography, 
4. Impact point and ground scars, 
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5. Significant aircraft parts, 
a. Four corners o{ the aircraft, 
b. Engines, props, and blade tips, 
c. Flight control surfaces and actuators, 
6. Aircrew locations, 
7. Ground fire boundary, 
8. Witness locations, 
9. Prevailing wind, 
10. Sun and moon position and phase. 
II. Impact Analysis 
A. Discuss the Methods Used in Determining Aircraft 
Speed and Direction at the Time of Impact [NAVAIR 
00-SOT-116-2 paragraph 1-3, 1-4, 1-5) 
1. Wreckage pattern evidence--the overall length 
and shape of the wreckage pattern, impact poi~t 
in relation to pieces of the wreckage, can 
provide an indicator of aircraft direction at 
the time of impact. In addition, the size of the 
pattern can also provide a good indication of 
aircraft speed at the time of impact. If the 
speed is low, the pattern will be relatively 
small and visa-versa. 
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2. Size and number of wreckage pieces--generally, 
the smaller the size and the greater the number 
of wreckage pieces, the faster the speed. 
Note: High-speed impacts result in a large pattern 
with small pieces. Low-speed impacts result 
in small patterns with big pieces. 
B. Define Angle of Impact and Discuss the Methods Used 
::1 Determining Impact Angle [NAVAIR 00-SOT-116-2 
paragraph 1-4, 1-6,1-7] 
1. The angle of impact is the angle formed by the 
velocity vector (flight path) and the terrain 
surface. It is not likely to be the same as the 
aircraft attitude at impact [Refer to NAVAIR 
Figures 1-1 through 1-7]. 
2. The angle of impact is important in estimating 
the maneuver being flown or the amount of energy 
absorbed during the impact with the terra1n. 
Energy absorption is a major issue when 
evaluating crash survivability. 
3. Determining flight path angle--this is 
generally estimated by examining damage to 
obstacles along the flight path and the ground 
scar or impact point [Refer to NAVAIR Figures 1-
8 through 1-10]. 
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4. Steep impact angles--impact angles greater than 
45~ generally leave a circular crater with 
numerous small pieces. High mass density parts 
will be buried in the crater. Leading edges, 1f 
found, will show severe compression. The depth 
of the crater will vary with the composition of 
the soil or rock. 
5. Shallow impact angles--impact angles less than 
4~ generally leave a long and narrow wreckage 
pattern. The ground scar may consist of several 
long gouges in the ground and a flat, shallow 
crater. High mass density parts will possibly 
be found furthest down the flight path line. 
c. Discuss the Methods Used in Determining Aircraft 
Attitude and Configuration at Impact [NAVAIR 00-
SOT-116-2 paragraph 1-8, 1-9, 1-17] 
1. Aircraft attitude at the time of impact can be 
determined by comparing ground scars that might 
contain aircraft wreckage pieces (aircraft skin, 
red or green navigation lights, wing hinges, 
etc.) with actual aircraft damage. 
2. Obstacles along the flight path should be 
examined for damage that reflects aircraft nose 
or bank attitude. 
120 
3. The dispersal pattern of the wreckage may 
provide additional clues as to the attitude of 
the aircraft at impact. For example, if a 
separated wing is found closer to the initial 
impact point than the rest of the wreckage, 
maybe this wing hit first and detached from the 
aircraft, supporting a wing-down attitude at 
impact theory. Corresponding ground scars might 
support this hypothesis. 
4. Aircraft configuration at the time of impact can 
be determined by noting current flap, gear, 
trim, etc., positions. Flight control actuators 
should be examined to verify aircraft impact 
configuration. 
Examine and document flight station controls to 
further analyze aircraft impact configuration. 
Note: Witness interviews can help in conducting 
and/or supporting impact analysis. 
III. Wreckage Pattern Evaluation 
A. Discuss the Characteristics of an In-Flight 
Structural Failure [NAVAIR 00-SOT-116-2 paragraph 
1-10, 1-12] 
1. Missing aircraft parts or components--if a 
critical aircraft part or component (control 
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surface, wing section, empennage, etc.) cannot 
be found at the site or is found back along the 
flight path short of the impact point then 
structural failure is probable. 
2. Unusual impact angle or attitude--if analysis 
of the impact angle or impact attitude ind~cates 
an unusual ground impact (aft-first, side-ways 
and inverted, etc.,) then in-flight structural 
failure is considered. 
B. Discuss the Methods of Identifying Spins [NAVAIR 
00-SOT-116-2 paragraph 1-10, 1-11] 
1. Wreckage pattern is small and concentrated. 
2. Depth of the relatively shallow impact ground 
scar will depend on the aircraft's weight and 
vertical speed in a spin, in addition to the 
composition of the terrain. 
3. Rotational energy of the aircraft will be 
obvious: 
a. The outside wing may be thrown forward during 
the impact, 
b. The inside wing will normally take the brunt 
of vertical collision with the ground, 
c. The vertical tail may fall in the direction 
of rotation when the rotation is stopped by 
impact, 
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d. Obstacles to the flight path will reflect its 
vertical nature. 
IV. Fire Analyaia 
A. Discuss the Characteristics of an In-Flight Fire 
[NAVAIR 00-SOT-116-2 paragraph 15-7] 
1. Temperature in excess of 2000'-F--this will melt 
materials that could not be melted in a ground 
fire. NAVAIR Volume 2, Table 15-4 provides the 
melting points of common alrcraft materials. 
2. The products of combustion will follow the 
airflow slipstream originating from a point 
source and expanding in a cone or V-shaped 
pattern. Soot and molten metal will adhere to 
anything in the path of the slipstream. When 
soot encounters an obstruction in its aftward 
flow, such as a rivet head, it may leave a 
clean, unsooted area on the downstream side of 
the obstruction. 
Note: Soot will not adhere to surfaces hotter than 
700"F. 
3. Molten metal tends to be splattered and finely 
dispersed on other parts of the aircraft. This 
metal is rough looking and can sometimes be 
easily removed with a knife. 
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Note: Single characte~istics or clues are not valid 
determinates of an in-flight fire. Look for 
a pattern of consistent evidence. 
B. Discuss the Characteristics of a Ground Fire 
[NAVAIR 00-SOT-116-2 paragraph 15-7] 
1. Temperature usually between 1600c and 2000 F, 
won't melt certain aircraft materials. 
2. The flow pattern of the products of combustion 
is up, sometimes modified depending on the local 
wind. Molten metal will flow down, pooling into 
larqe, smooth puddles of molten material. Soot 
patterns, if not destroyed by the ground fire, 
are generally arranged in an upward or 
inconsistent pattern. 
C. Address the Clues at the Mishap Site that Help in 
Determining What Happened First; the Fire or the 
Impact [NAVAIR 00-SOT-116-2 paragraph 15-7, 15-8] 
1. Crumpled parts--if evidence of fire is found 
inside the folds of crumpled metal, this would 
suggest that the fire occurred before impact. 
2. Fractured edges--if exposure to fire occurred 
before impact, the edges of parts fractured in 
the impact should be clean and free of soot. 
3. Buried parts--the portion of the wreckage that 
is buried in the ground at the impact site 
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should not be exposed to post-impact fire. If 
this wreckage shows signs of fire damage this lS 
a good indication of an in-flight fire. 
4. Mud and soot--in theory, the mud should be on 
top of the soot in an in-flight fire, and the 
soot on top of the mud in a post impact fire. 
Note: These are only techniques to be used in 
classifying the fire as either in-flight or 
post impact. Certain situations could make 
these investigative methods invalid. 
Note: NAVAIR paragraph 15-7(e)4 provides examples 
of additional fire analysis techniques. 
Note: Witnesses can provide good evidence to 
support or oppose the presence of an in-
flight fire. 
v. Volume II, System Analysis Review 
A. Briefly Discuss the Principal Focus of the 
Technical Manual Safety Investigation Volume II, 
NAVAIR 00-SOT-116-2, Chapters 3-16. 
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4.5 ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONAL REFERENCES 
4.51 Diagramming the Wreckage Scene, R.H. Wood, reproduced 
in Avlation Safety Programs, Aircraft Mishap 
Investigation, pages 57-63. 
4.52 Aircraft Mishap Investigation, Avlation Safety 
Programs, Lessons 6-10, 12 & 13. 
4.6 HELPFUL NOTES 
A. Use the wreckage diagrams provided in Aircraft 
Mishap Investigations, pages 53-56, during the 
diagramming poLtion of the lesson lecture. An 
alternative to this would be to construct your own 
versions of these diagrams. This would give the 
AMB larger diagrams to examine and provide 
practical diagramming experience to the creator. 
B. Using a scale model of the squadron aircraft whlle 
presenting the impact analysis of the lesson is 
recommended. This will provide a better "visual" 
picture to the AMB during this portion of the 
lesson plus it will ensure that the squadron has an 
aircraft model on-hand for witness interviews and 
other investigative purposes. 
C. Because of the technical content of the lesson 
material, use the Wing/Group Safety Officer to 
assist with the instruction of this lesson. 
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APPENDIX A-2. DUTY OFFICE WATCH TEAM TRAINING SEGMENT 
Duty Office Watch Team 
Training Segment 
127 
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SQUADRON DUTY OFFICE TRAINING 
DUTY OFFICE OVERVIEW 
There are, it seems, two separate crises to contend 
with when an aircraft mishap occurs. The first is to cope 
with the incident itself; coordinating Search and Rescue 
(SAR) efforts and/or aircraft recovery, notifying all 
required personnel and organizations, and completing the 
essential voice and written reporting requirements. The 
second crisis is to deal with the aftermath of the mishap. 
Organizing the investigative effort, managing the flood of 
telephone calls from worried spouses, friends, and 
relatives, in addition to dealing with the press and media. 
The Squadron Duty Office Watch Team is normally the 
first squadron unit notified of an actual squadron mishap 
and is the squadron entity most likely to deal with both 
crises mentioned above. The Squadron Duty Office, as a 
unit, is normally comprised of a Squadron Duty Officer 
(SDO)/ Operations Duty Officer (ODO), an Assistant Squadron 
Duty Officer (ASDO), and a Duty Driver. These personnel are 
key participants in the successful management of an aircraft 
mishap. This unit, particularly the Squadron Duty Officer, 
needs to be extremely knowledgeable and well-trained on the 
content, requirements, and scope of the Squadron Premishap 
Plan to effectively supervise this unusual and possibly 
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volatile situation. However, because of the ever-changing 
composition of the unit, training these watch teams can be a 
remarkably difficult endeavor. Generally, the Squadron Duty 
Office is manned by rotating crews through the three "watch 
billets," (SDO, ASDO, and Duty Driver), or by randomly 
assigning qualified squadron personnel to these positions. 
Depending on the "watchbill" for any given month, the actual 
watch team composition could vary for every shift every day. 
This of course is a worst-case training scenario, but it 
does reveal the variability of the duty office watch team. 
It would be impossible for the Squadron Aviation Safety 
Officer to conduct duty office training everyday to account 
for this duty office variability. The ASO has numerous 
other safety and squadron-related responsibilities that 
require his/her attention. However, certain training 
techniques can be employed by the ASO to ensure effective 
and efficient premishap training of squadron duty office 
watch teams. By coordinating with the squadron Senior Watch 
Officer and utilizing squadron safety department personnel 
and assets in a organized and methodical manner, 
constructive duty office premishap training can occur. 
The principle method presented in this section for 
conducting duty office premishap training develops in three 
distinct phases. These phases, listed in order of 
occurrence, are as follows: 
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1. Self-instruction or self-study of the squadron 
premishap plan accomplished by the individual squadron 
duty office watch teams. 
2. Evaluation of watch team premishap knowledge thrcugh 
duty office premishap simulations/"drills." 
3. Assessing the effectiveness and the comprehensiveness 
of both the squadron premishap plan and the squadron 
duty office training effort by examining simulation 
feedback. This simulation feedback consists of 
written evaluations which measure how well each duty 
office watch team compares to previously established 
premishap plan performance criteria. This phase 
provides a method to examine the current squadron 
premishap plan and the current duty office training 
strategy. The watch team evaluations will identify 
current deficiencies in these areas and provide a 
method for reviewing and revising either the squadron 
premishap plan and/or the duty office training 
program. 
The next three sections of the duty office training 
segment will provide guidance to support the duty office 
training format presented above. The specific topics 
addressed are as follows: 1) duty office simulation 
preparation, 2) conducting the duty office simulation, and 
3) assessing both the duty office watch team performance and 
1 31 
the content of the squadron premishap plan. The information 
provided in these sections will provide the squadron 
Aviation Safety Officer and squadron Safety Department with 
an easy-to-use instructional framework to prepare, instruct 
and evaluate, the duty office watch team. 
DUTY OFFICE SIMULATION PREPARATION 
The procedures used in preparing a duty office 
simulation are incorporated in two phases. First, the ASO 
needs to ensure that premishap training program of self-
instruction is in place and working as planned. This can be 
accomplished by utilizing the following methods: 
1. Coordinating with the squadron Senior Watch Officer to 
incorporate reading the entire premishap plan 1nto the 
duty office SDO/ASDO qualification process. 
2. Implementing, as a standing procedure, that the 
oncoming SDO read the premishap plan, at a minimum, 
the SDO immediate action requirements, (first 30 
minutes), prior to assuming the watch. 
3. Reinforcing watch team knowledge by discussi, J 
individual and team mishap actions in accordance with 
the premishap plan. Inform these watch teams that 
periodic drills will be performed to evaluate their 
applied mishap management skills and their knowledge 
of the squadron premishap plan. 
132 
4. Announcing at squadron All Off~cer Meetings (AOM) that 
duty office drills will be performed regularly. Work 
load permitting, conduct one drill every two-weeks, 
varying the day of the week and the time of day of the 
drill. 
The second phase encompasses the planning and 
organization of the duty office mishap simulation. This 
simulation can be an announced, prearranged drill, or it can 
be an unannounced, surprise evolution. The minimum 
recommended planning procedures used in organizing the 
unannounced duty office simulation are listed in the 
following section. These procedures can be utilized in 
planning for an announced drill also. Obviously, the only 
difference will be announcing in advance the time and place 
of the simulation to the duty office watch team being 
drilled. Both types of drills, announced and unannounced, 
have their advantages and disadvantages. However, the 
unannounced drill tends to produce the truest test of watch 
team premishap knowledge and preparation, and it best 
displays the effectiveness and workability of the squadron 
premishap plan. 
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Planning and Organizing 
1. Prearrange a time with the Commanding Officer and the 
Operations Officer to conduct the simulation. Ensure that 
the duty office simulation will not conflict with other 
squadron training or operational requirements. 
2. Construct a simulation scenario to be presented to the 
duty office watch team. Scenarios can be derived using 
prior mishaps or constructed by the simulation team. If 
possible, have all persons participating in the simulation 
present during this discussion. At a minimum, two persons 
are required to perform a functional duty office simulation. 
A three person team is optimal. 
3. Divide the duties to be performed during the simulation. 
Specific d .tties to be accomplished include: 
a. The drill needs to be initiated. Either by a phone 
call to the duty office or by a simulation team member 
personally notifying the duty office of the drill and 
the mishap scenario. 
b. The duty office watch team's reaction to the drill and 
their ensuing premishap plan execution needs to be 
monitored. The monitor member should observe the duty 
office watch team's coordination in managing the 
simulated mishap. This member should also ensure that 
all non-drill related personnel interacting with the 
duty office, during the simulation, are aware of the 
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exercise. In addition, this member needs to confirm 
that all phone calls made by the duty office either go 
to a preassigned s~mulation phone contact (internal to 
the squadron) or, if external to the command, are 
preceded by the statement; "This is a drill, this is a 
drill." Note: keeping all communications within the 
command is the recommended procedure. 
c. Establish a point of contact for all duty office phone 
communications. This person will field all duty office 
phone communications, from the five-minute OPREP voice 
message to the duty office mishap recall of squadron 
personnel. This member will also call the duty office 
role playing 1) a member of the media, 2) a worried 
spouse, and 3) a witness to the simulated mishap. 
d. Create a means for the duty office monitor to 
communicate with the simulation communications member. 
This can be accomplished through the optional third 
member or by using the duty driver or other available 
squadron member. This third member can also act as a 
simulated on-scene squadron witness providing the duty 
office with prearranged mishap updates. 
4. Prior to presenting the duty office mishap simulation, 
the simulation team should discuss the mishap simulation 
sequence of events. What will occur and when will it occur? 
Review the current squadron premishap plan and work through 
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the first thirty minutes of a mishap. What are the SDO's 
initial requirements? What are the ASDO's initial 
requirements? What should the duty driver accomplish during 
this period? What would be the most effective way of 
directing the watch team and assigning duty office team 
responsibilities? These are examples of information to 
discuss prior to initiating the simulation. This discussion 
will ensure that everyone conducting the simulation is 
cognizant of distinct mishap requirements and their speciflc 
sequence of occurrence. 
Conducting the Simulation 
Upon completing the steps recommended above, in 
addition to any other actions you deem necessary to prepare 
for the drill, the process of conducting the simulation can 
then occur. 
This section of the duty office premishap training 
program will give a specific example of a duty office drill. 
Walking through each event, as it happens, will provide the 
reader with a generic demonstration of the events and 
procedures encompassed in a duty office simulation. Note: 
these events will not cover all possible situations or 
circumstances resulting from a duty office drill but should 




1. Commanding Officer and Operations Officer notified and 
approve the duty office simulation request. 
2. The scenario agreed upon by the three member simulation 
team is as follows: "Aircraft 00, event # 0 on the flight 
schedule, departed the runway on takeoff. The aircraft came 
to rest on the left side of runway 00. No smoke or fire 
present at the site. Fatalities or injuries unknown at the 
present time." Updates to this report will include: 1) one 
known minor injury (broken arm of crewmember) at the scene 
and 2) major damage to the main and nose landing gear and 
damage to the left wing. 
3. The simulation duties are divided as follows: 
a. The ASO will act as the monitor and administrator for 
the simulation (3b. above). The ASO will be located 
in the duty office for the entire simulation. 
b. The Ground Safety Officer (GSO) will take the duties 
of handling duty office phone communications and role 
playing callers (3c. above). The GSO will also 
initiate the drill by phoning the duty office (3a. 
above). It is recommended that this individual 
have two different telephone lines for 
communications--one line to receive duty office 
telephone communications and the other line to 
conduct the role playing calls. 
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c. The Aviation Safety Petty Officer will pass 
information between the monitor (ASO) and the 
communications member (GSO). This member will also 
provide the duty office watch team with simulated 
mishap updates as the drill progresses (3d. above). 
The Simulation Ezercise 
Event 1 
The communications member calls the duty office and recites: 
"This is a drill, this is a drill. This is the tower 
calling. Aircraft 00 has just departed the runway and is 
positioned to the left of runway 00. No smoke or fire is 
present at the scene. Fatalities and injuries unknown at 
this time. Crash and rescue is responding. This is only a 
drill." 
Event 2 
The monitor enters the duty office at the time of the mishap 
notification call. The monitor hands the ASDO a note which 
states: All calls made to #555-5555 (preassigned simulation 
phone number). The monitor informs the SDO that he is there 
to administer and monitor the drill and not to participate 
in its execution. 
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Event 3 
Mon1tor evaluates the watch team's execut1on of the squadron 
premishap plan, taking notes on good areas as well as 
substandard areas. (A list containing the minimum 
recommended evaluation criteria is presented in the next 
section, "Assessing Duty Office Performance"). 
Event 4 
Communications member receives duty office phone reports 
i.e. OPREP-3 voice report, squadron personnel recall, etc., 
taking notes on quality, timeliness, and substance of 
communications. (A list containing the minimum recommended 
evaluation criteria is presented in the next section, 
"Assessing Duty Office Performance"). 
Event 5 
Communications member calls duty office and role plays a 
member of the press. (Specific role-playing informat1on is 
provided in the next section, "Assessing Duty Office 
Performance"). 
Event 6 
Communications member calls duty office and role plays a 
worried spouse or relative. 
Event 7 
The third team member (ASPO) advises the SDO that there is 
only one minor injury at the mishap site. 
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Event 8 
Communications member calls duty office and role plays a 
witness to the simulated mishap. 
Event 9 
The third team member advises the SDO that there is maJOr 
damage to the mishap aircraft's left wing. Also, he states 
that the nose and main landing gear appear to be destroyed. 
Event 10 
The simulation is terminated. The monitor informs the watch 
team that they will be debriefed after the simulatio.l team 
prepares its assessment. 
Simulation Suggestions 
1. The simulation should last between twenty and forty-five 
minutes. At a minimum, complete up through the twenty 
minute OPREP-3 written message. 
2. Allow ample time between events for the watch team to 
react to a specific event. Evaluate the priorities be~ng 
set by the watch team and observe how they manage and 
accomplish these different situations. 
3. Vary the scenarios to fit realistic operating conditions. 
Deployment scenarios should differ slightly from at-home 
scenarios. Remember to make the scenarios realistic and 
straight-forward. Don't unnecessarily overload an already 
anxious duty office watch team. Also, whenever possible use 
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past mishap reports when developlng scenarlos. Contact the 
Wing Safety Officer or the Naval Safety Center for relevant 
Mishap Investigation Report (MIR) scenarios to reference in 
designing your various simulation exercises. 
Duty Office Assessment 
The following procedures will establish baseline 
criteria for the simulation monitor and communications 
member to use in assessing the watch team performance and 
their premishap plan knowledge. These criteria are divlded 
into premishap plan criteria and management criteria. These 
criteria will also provide information to use in updating 
and revising the squadron premishap plan. Review and amend 
these criteria as necessary to conform to individual 
squadron requirements. These guidelines will also provide 
the communications member with role-playing suggestions to 
evaluate certain ASDO responses. 
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A. DUTY OF~ICE MONITOR 
Premishap Plan Criteria 
1 . Notification of the Mishap 
a. Does the squadron premishap plan include an aircraft 
mishap notification checklist? 
o Yes O No Comment __________________________________ _ 
b. Did the SDO follow the aircraft mishap notification 
checklist provided in the squadron premishap plan? 
o Yes o No Comment __________________________________ _ 
c. If so, is this checklist readily available to the 
squadron watch team and do they all know where to 
find it? 
o Yes o No Comment __________________________________ _ 
d. Did the SDO verify that SAR, the crash/fire 
department, and medical were notified? 
o Yes o No Comment 
-----------------------------------
If not, make sure the SDO realizes that these 
departments need to be informed as-soon-as-possible. 
e. Record the time the simulation was initiated and 
the time when watch team procedures and actions 
occur, (develop a time-line). Time initiated ________ _ 
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2. Verification of the Mishap 
a. If the notification was given by an individual or 
unit over the phone (not via the squadron crash 
phone), did the SDO obtain this individual's name and 
telephone number and call them back to verify the 
validity of the report? 
c Yes o No Comment __________________________________ _ 
Note: when in doubt, start the immediate action 
requirements first, then look to authenticate the 
notification. 
3. Recall and Notification of Essential Personnel 
a. Were the Commanding Officer and Executive Officer 
notified immediately? 
o Yes o No Comment 
-----------------------------------
b. Was the premishap plan recall initiated? 
o Yes o No Comment __________________________________ _ 
Does this list include all required personnel; i.e., 
ASO, AMB members, Operations Officer, CACO, etc., 
O Yes O No Comment 
-----------------------------------
Are all names on the recall clearly printed and 
cur~ent with the squadron billet listing? 
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o Yes o No Comment 
-------------------------------------
Are all recall telephone numbers clearly printed and 
up-to-date? 
o Yes o No Comment __________________________________ ___ 
4. OPREP-3 Voice Report 
a. Was the OPREP-3 report given and was it required? 
(Depends on the scenario.) 
o Yes o No Comment __________________________________ ___ 
b. Was the reporting format correct and was it clearly 
stated? 
o Yes o No Comment __________________________________ ___ 
c. Is an example of this report included in the squadron 
premishap plan? 
o Yes O No Comment __________________________________ ___ 
Is it correct in content/format? 
o Yes O No Comment __________________________________ ___ 
Is the reporting authorities telephone number listed 
and up-to-date? 
o Yes o No Comment __________________________________ ___ 
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d. Was this voice report given within the 5-minute time 
requirement? 
o Yes o No Comment __________________________________ _ 
If not, record the time of transmission ______________ _ 
5. Determine Mishap Classification 
a. Did the SDO accurately determine that a mishap had 
occurred? 
o Yes o No Comment __________________________________ _ 
b. What references did the SDO utilize to determine 
this? 
---------------------------------------------------
Does the premishap plan include this information? 
o Yes o No Comment 
-----------------------------------
6. Chain-of-Command Notification 
a. Did the SDO ensure that the required departments in 
the squadron's chain-of-command were notified of the 
mishap? 
o Yes o No Comment 
-----------------------------------
b. Does the premishap plan clearly list these 
departments and provide up-to-date telephone numbers? 
145 
0 Yes o No Comment 
------------------------------------
7. OPREP-3 Message Report 
a. Was the reporting format correct in accordance with 
OPNAVINST 3100.6? 
o Yes o No Comment __________________________________ __ 
b. Is a skeleton OPREP-3 message provided in the 
squadron premishap plan? 
o Yes o No Comment __________________________________ __ 
Did the SDO utilize this supporting tool? 
o Yes o No Comment __________________________________ __ 
c. Is an example of a generic Oprep-3 written report 
included in the premishap plan? 
o Yes o No Comment __________________________________ __ 
Is it correct in content/format in accordance with 
OPNAVINST 3100.6? 
o Yes o No Comment __________________________________ __ 
d. Was this message report given within the 20 minute 
time requirement? 
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c Yes c No Comment __________________________________ ___ 
If not, record the time of message release __________ __ 
Note: Have the SDO or directed representative draft-
up an actual 20-minute message for the ASO, or duty 
office monitor, to examine for completeness during 
the simulation debrief. If possible, put this 
message format on computer disk and attach it to 
the premishap plan. This will help speed-up the 
drafting of this message. 
8. Miscellaneous Requirements 
a. Was a chronological log of events kept by the SDO or 
other designated squadron person? 
c Yes c No Comment 
-------------------------------------
Was the log legible and did it contain all necessary 
information connected with the simulated mishap 
(phone conversations, message releases, receipts, 
events and any unusual problems encountered)? 
c Yes c No Comment 
-------------------------------------
Were these events listed promptly and in the order 
of their occurrence? 
c Yes No Comment __________________________________ ___ 
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Duty Office Management Criteria 
1. Initial Response 
a. Upon simulated mishap notification, did the SDO know 
the location of the premishap plan and the emergency 
action file (if applicable)? 
c Yes c No Comment __________________________________ __ 
b. Did the SDO have an established plan-of-action to 
respond to the simulated mishap, (in accordance with 
the premishap plan)? 
c Yes c No Comment __________________________________ _ 
2. Watch Team Guidance 
a. Did the SDO utilize the duty office watch team 
effectively by delegating required mishap duties 
(ASDO start on squadron telephone recall, Duty Driver 
handle the chronological log, etc.)? 
c Yes c No Comment __________________________________ __ 
b. Did the SDO solicit assistance from other available 
squadron personnel? 
c Yes c No Comment __________________________________ __ 
If so, did the SDO clearly direct them on their 
responsibilities? 
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o Yes o No Comment __________________________________ __ 
c. How efficiently did the SDO execute the premishap 
plan requirements (how comfortable was the SDO with 
the plan)? 
Comment ________________________________________________ _ 
Additional Remarks 
1. The duty office monitor is responsible for the 
administration of the simulation. This member needs to 
ensure that the simulation is conducted without interference 
from outside parties. Post a notice at the duty office 
informing squadron personnel of the simulation. Also, 
ensure that all simulation communications are kept in-
squadron. If, for training reasons, telephone calls are 
made to outside commands, ensure that 1) the Commanding 
Officer approves and 2) all outside communications are 
prefaced with "This is a drill, this is a drill." 
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8. COMMUNICATIONS MEMBER 
Communications Member Overview 
1. The communications member is assigned with receiving all 
incoming duty office phone communications and recording 
their time of receipt. Recording the time of all 
communications will allow the simulation team to develop an 
accurate time-line to evaluate the duty office watch team's 
procedural priorities. In addition, this member will role 
play, at a minimum, three diffe ~nt 1ndividuals; a news 
reporter, a worried relative or spouse, and a potential 
mishap witness. This role playing exercise will test the 
watch team's knowledge of information security (privilege), 
and assess their overall communications proficiency. 
Premishap Criteria 
1. Notification/Verification of the Mishap 
a. Did the duty office follow the premishap plan 
aircraft mishap notification checklist? 
C Yes c No Comment __________________________________ _ 
Did the duty office inform you to stay by the phone 
so they could call you back and confirm the report? 
C Yes c No Comment 
-----------------------------------
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Did they ask for a name and telephone number? 
o Yes o No Comment __________________________________ __ 
Note: The communications member should have a copy of 
the premishap plan aircraft mishap notification 
checklist while administering this segment of the 
scenario. This will confirm completion of all 
required checklist items. 
2. Recall of Personnel 
a. Record the time and order of squadron personnel 
recalled. 
b. Did the watch team member use the correct recall 
voice format: "This is the duty office, we 
are conducting a general recall. Please report to 
the duty office immediately~" 
o Yes o No Comment __________________________________ _ 
c. Did the watch team member give out any additional 
mishap information when prompted? 
o Yes o No Comment __________________________________ _ 
If so, what? __________________________________________ __ 
1 51 
,----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. Oprep-3 Voice Report 
a. Was the reporting format correct ana clearly stated? 
0 Yes o No Comment __________________________________ ___ 
b. Was it delivered within the 5-minute time constraint? 
o Yes o No Comment 
-------------------------------------
Record the time of transmission 
-----------
4. Chain-of-Command Notification 
a. Were all chain-of-command notification calls 
completed? 
O Yes o No Comment 
-------------------------------------
b. Was the format correct and clearly stated? 
o Yes o No Comment 
-------------------------------------
Role Playing Information 
1. Media Representative 
a. Contact the squadron duty office impersonating a 
member of the local media. The intent of this 
character is to obtain as much information from the 
duty office watch team as possible. Try and acquire 
crewmember's names, aircraft type, aircraft mission, 
number of injuries, damage estimates, etc. 
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b. The duty office should only confirm the report of a 
mishap of undetermined magnitude and supply the name 
and number of the squadron and/or wing Public Affairs 
Officer (PAO) as a point of future contact. The duty 
office watch team should be polite but should clear 
the line ASAP to free-up squadron telephone lines. 
2. Relative or Spouse 
a. Contact the squadron duty office impersonating a 
relative or spouse of a squadron crewmember who JUSt 
heard about the mishap. The intent of this character 
is to obtain as much information as possible from the 
duty office watch team but from a personally lnvolved 
third party angle. Be emotional and persistent with 
this character in attempting to obtain information! 
b. The duty office should only confirm the report of the 
mishap and provide the name and number of the 
squadron and/or wing CACO and PAO. The duty office 
watch team should be courteous but not allow the 
phone line to be tied-up for any length of time. 
3. Potential Mishap Witness 
a. Contact the squadron duty office impersonating a 
witness to the simulated mishap. Tell the duty 
office, in-detail, what was observed. 
b. The duty office should ask for the witnesses name 
and telephone number and ask him or her to please 
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call back the next day unless contacted by a squadron 
representative. They should thank the person for 
calling and then clear the line. The duty office 
should not allow the potential witness to go through 
the entire story in detail. Duty office personnel 
should be quick, courteous, and to the point! 
4. Senior Ranking Officer Within the Chain-of-Command 
(opt1onal). 
a. Contact the squadron duty office impersonating the 
senior ranking officer within the squadrons chain-
of-command. Get as much information out of the 
watch team as possible. Document what and how 
information is furnished to this caller. Does the 
duty office refer you to the squadron Commanding 
Officer for comment or do they supply all of the 
answers? Does the duty office verify in any way the 
validity of this caller (copying the phone number 
and telephoning this caller back)? 
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C. POST-SIMULATION DEBRIEFING 
1. Upon completion of the simulation, the members of the 
duty office simulation team need to compare notes and 
information. By using the criteria g~ven above, evaluate 
the strengths and the weaknesses of the watch team's 
performance. Discuss individual performance as well as team 
coordination and performance issues. 
2. When debriefing the watch team (all members), discuss in 
chronological order, the events of the simulation. Use the 
assessment checklists presented in the earlier section as a 
debriefing guide. As the events of the simulation unfold, 
address both the ~earn's strong points and the team's weak 
points. Provide instruction on proper team mishap 
procedures in accordance with the squadron's premlshap plan 
as necessary. The exact format for this ~briefing is left 
to the discretion of the safety department. 
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APPENDIX A-3. BASE-WIDE PREMISBAP SIMULATIONS TRAINING 
SEGMENT 
Base-Wide Premishap 
Simulations Training Segment 
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BASE-WIDE PREMISBAP SIMULATIONS 
PURPOSF 
One way for squadrons to gain requisite mishap 
knowledge and experience, without the occurrence of an 
actual squadron aircraft mishap, is to conduct premishap 
simulations. Such a simulation would entail incorporating 
the various elements, participants, and considerations 
associated with an aircraft mishap into a properly designed, 
planned, controlled, and adequately supervised mishap 
training exercise. Aircraft premishap simulations can be 
valuable learning exercises that allow the squadron and 
other base·departments/commands the opportunity to verify 
the practicality and usefulness of their respective 
premishap/emergency preparedness plans. Premishap 
simulations provide not only a means to evaluate squadron, 
wing, and base premishap/emergency preparedness programs, 
but also provide a constructive, "hands-on" mishap training 
environment, which provides and stimulates additional 
learning opportunities. This environment allows the 
airstation mishap participants to apply their previously 
learned mishap skills, knowledge, and techniques to a "real 
world", functional, and coordinated mishap scenario. It 
also allows these participants the opportunity to practice 
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their actual mishap roles and responsibilities under unique 
"operational" conditions. Furthermore, premishap 
simulations enable participants to meet and interact with 
one-another, building professional affiliation and working 
relationships prior to an actual mishap incident. This 
prior affiliation can be vitally important to mishap command 
and control efforts during the initial chaotic moments 
following an actual aircraft mishap. In addition, these 
premishap exercises will also allow the simulation 
participants the opportunity to thoroughly familiarize 
themselves with all airstation pre/post mishap-related 
facilities and services. 
The purpose of this section of the "Squadron Premishap 
Training Program" is to provide guidance to assist the 
squadron safety department in planning, organizing, 
administering, and evaluating base-wide mishap simulations. 
In accomplishing this purpose, the base-wide/airstation 
premishap simulations section will provide the following two 
elements: 
1. The premishap simulation will provide a verifiable 
means for the safety department to evaluate the thoroughness 
and effectiveness of previously administered Aircraft Mishap 
Board and Squadron Duty Office Watch Team training sessions. 
2. The premishap simulation format will also provide the 




proficiency gained in the classroom lectures into applled 
mishap performance skills. Further explanation of this 
concept is as follows: 
The Aircraft Mishap Board training lessons given in 
Appendix A-1 provide the AMB Senior Member/squadron ASO 
with the materials to administer premishap instruction to 
the AMB members in primarily a lecture format. The 
"hands-on" design of a premishap simulation scenario 
provides the AMB members with an opportunity to actually 
practice and perform the procedures, techniques, and 
methods learned during these AMB lectures. Thus, the 
knowledge learned in the classroom is transferred to 
applied skills in the simulated enviroP~~nt. The actual 
application of these learned skills, even though practiced 
under simulated conditions, is required to effectively 
perform under actual mishap conditions. 
BASE-WIDE SIMULATION PLANNING 
Of the topics addressed in this portion of the training 
program; planning, organizing, administering, and 
evaluating, planning is probably the most important overall 
factor in executing a functional and realistic premishap 
simulation. This section will present several guidelines to 
consider when planning a full scale mishap simulation. 
Guidelines, originally developed by Transport Canada [Ref. 
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18], were adopted for use here. 
Definition of the Participants 
The first step taken by the squadron safety department 
in planning a base-wide/airstation mishap simulation is to 
establish a squadron simulation planning team. This team 
should include the squadron Safety Officer/Department Head, 
the Aviation Safety Officer, the Ground Safety Officer, the 
Aviation Safety Petty Officer (enlisted member), and the 
appropriate Wing/Group Safety Officer. Once formed, this 
simulation planning team can initially determine several 
important items: 
1. What squadron departments, workcenters, and 
individuals need to be included in the mishap simulation. 
Determining a rough estimate of the number of squadron 
personnel to be trained and/or used in administering the 
simulation will define several internal planning issues. 
2. What non-squadron commands and departments (crash-
fire-rescue, EOD, F lperations, etc.) should be included 
in the simulation. 'I'!L.Ls question is clarified further in 
later discussion when the simulation scenario and the scope 
of the exercise planning topics are addressed. 
A specific list of recommended simulation planning team 
topics (used by Canadian simulation planners) is listed in 
the ensuing paragraphs. These guidelines provide an 
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established and proven planning strategy to be used during 
the simulation planning process. Also, remember that 
determining all possible simulation parameters and 
participants, in addition to the exact scope of the 
exercise, is determined throughout the planning process. 
Don't try and complete the entire mishap planning process in 
one meeting. Thorough planning for this type of evolut~on 
will probably take several weeks (or even longer) to 
complete. 
Definition of the Scenario 
A realistic, uncomplicated scenario should be developed 
by the squadron simulation planning team. Prior mishap 
investigation reports are good sources to use in building 
simulation scenarios. The Wing Safety Officer should have 
access to "sanitized" versions of these reports. In 
addition, the Naval Safety Center, COMM (804) 444-3520, can 
provide assistance. 
Remember, don't over complicate the simulation by over 
complicating the scenario. Keep it simple and straight-
forward! 
Scope of the Ezercise 
Defining the scope of the exercise should be done 
early-on in the planning cycle. In defining the scope of 
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Grgup Tgpic Instructgr Time 
AMB Mishap Site Security ASO 0:15 
AMB Mishap Photography Wing Safety 0:15 
AMB Witness Interviewing ASO 0:30 
AMB Field Investigations Wing Safety 0:30 
AMB Aircraft Records Analysis ASO 1:00 
AMB MIR Reporting Requirements ASO 1:00 
Duty Office General Mishap Duties GSO/ASPO UNK 
Squadron Site Security Briefing AMB Senior Member 0:15 
Security 
Emergency General Mishap Duties Team Supervisor UNK 
Reclamation 
Team 
PAO Mishap Support Duties Safety Officer UNK 
Admin Dept. Mishap Support Duties Safety Officer UNK 
CACO Mishap Support Duties Safety Officer UNK 
Leaal Dept. Post-Mishap Reauirements Safety Officer UNK 
Tabla A.l 
the simulation, the planning team needs to specify the 
physical boundaries within which the plan is to operate 
i.e., off-duty runway, taxiway, outlying field, etc., in 
accordance with the agreed-upon simulation scenario. In 
addition, the time-length of the simulation and the amount 
·~ 
of interaction with other commands should be specified. 
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Procedures to be Tauqht and/or Exercised 
Deciding on the procedures/topics to be taught and/or 
evaluated, in addition to determining who will accomplish 
the instruction and evaluation is probably the most 
important and the most time consuming phase in the 
simulation planning process. DuriPq the initial planning 
phase, prior to meeting with the proposed external 
participants, it is important to focus on squadron-specific 
groups, topics, and procedures to teach and evaluate during 
the simulation. Emphasis here should be placed on the 
evaluation of previously learned knowledge and skills but 
because of the superb training environment created by the 
simulation exercise, select mishap-related training should 
also occur. Table A.1 is provided to assist in determining 
what groups, topics, and procedures to incorporate into this 
process. The information provided in the table above 
depicts the minimum squadron (internal) departments/groups 
to include in the simulation exercise. The instructional 
topics listed for each group provide the recommended topics 
to be trained and evaluated during the simulation. Specific 
lesson content is left to the discretion of the respective 
topic instructor. However, it is recommended that the ASO 
and the other specified instructors utilize the AMB lesson 
plans and the Duty Office Watch Team information provided in 
the first two sections of the "Squadron Premishap Training 
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Program" when formulating lessons and evaluations for the 
AMB and the squadron Duty Office. 
Note: This program recommends conducting all 
simulation training and evaluation in the field, i.e., at 
the specified simulated mishap site. This will allow 
instructors to take full advantage of the training 
opportunities provided by the outdoor/operational 
environment, i.e., statically positioned aircraft, 
surrounding terrain, vehicle traffic, etc. However, the AMB 
should conduct the Aircraft Records Analysis and the MIR 
Reporting Requirement segments in a designated squadron 
space. These two training segments take place after the 
conclusion of the "outdoor" simulation exercise (possibly 
the next day) . The ASO and Wing Safety Officer should use 
OPNAVINST 3750.6Q and Aviation Safety Programs, Aircraft 
Mishap Investigation as the primary references for 
constructing these two lesson lectures. 
Controllinq Orqanization 
Since the squadron is the command initiating and 
overseeing the conduct of the simulation, unless otherwise 
specified, the squadron assumes the title of simulation 
controlling authority. 
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Evaluators to be Present 
Evaluators are a very important part of the entire 
simulation training process. However, including too many 
individuals into the scenario increases the supervision and 
communication workload required to administer and evaluate 
the scenario. This program recommends using the 
instructor(s), listed above in Table A.1, as both the 
instructor and the evaluator for their respective areas of 
the simulation. Specifically, the units and the evaluators 
recommended during a simulation (at a minimum) are as 
follows: 
1. AMB--The ASO and Wing Safety Officer are responsible 
for directing, instructing, and evaluating this unit. 
2. Duty Office--The Ground Safety Officer and the 
Aviation Safety Petty Officer, because of their prior 
experience conducting watch team drills, are 
responsible for evaluating this unit. 
3. All support functions (PAO, CACO, Legal, etc.,)--The 
squadron Safety Officer is responsible for directing, 
instructing, and evaluating these units. 
4. Emergency Reclamation Team--The team supervisor 
and/or the AMB maintenance member (time permitting) 
are responsible for training and evaluating this unit. 
5. Commanding Officer and the conduct of the overall 
exercise--The squadron Safety Officer is responsible 
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for up-dating the commanding officer on the specifics 
of the exercise. This person also oversees and 
controls the entire simulation process. 
Any additional unit/squadron training requested by the 
command should be assigned to a qualified instructor. The 
ASO and/or the squadron Safety Officer shall review all 
instructional lessons and mat~rial prior to the simulation. 
Format of Critiques 
The final guideline that needs to be addressed by the 
simulation planning team is the format of the performance 
critiques. In order to properly analyze and interpret the 
results of the training exercise, the instructors/evaluators 
need to rate the performance of each squadron group using 
the same format. This standardized method is necessary to 
compare and measure the resulting performance of the various 
squadron units receiving training. This information is also 
helpful in measuring and examining past simulation 
performance/outcomes compared to current simulation 
performance/outcomes (compare past performance to current 
performance to determine proficiency/d~ficiency trends) . 
As per the Navy ISD model, presented in NAVEDTRA 110A, 
this training program recommends using the numerical (one 
through five) rating scale to measure specific performance 
criteria. In addition, a comment section should be provided 
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after each of these performance ratings and at the 
conclusion of the critique for additional evaluator 
suggestions. An example of this format is provided in the 
"Simulation Evaluation" section presented later. 
Additionally, Appendix B-3 provides an example of a training 
evaluation form for use in conducting simulation 
assessments. 
ORGANIZING THE SIMULATION 
Once the squadron simulation planning team defines and 
establishes the guidelines listed in the planning section 
given above, the simulation organizing effort can commence. 
The simulation organizational effort is divided into two 
distinct areas. First, coordinating with the other tenant 
commands/units who will be participating in the simulation 
and second, doing the internal preparation work (i.e., 
developing the AMB and Duty Office simulation training 
lessons/materials, etc.) required to professionally conduct 
this prereishap training exercise. 
Coordination of Participants 
Involving other commands ~ d units in the mishap 
simulation adds both a sense of realism to the scenario and 
provides all participants with additional mishap training 
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opportunities. The process of organizing this portion of 
the simulation t&kes place in three primary steps. First, 
contact each prospective simulation participant and inform 
them of the intended mishap simulation proposed by your 
command. Provide them with a brief background of the 
exercise, solicit their participat1on, and then arrange a 
meeting for all participants, (the second step). At the 
initial gathering of all simulation participants (the second 
step in the process) discuss the squadron's planning 
elements (i.e., scope, scenario, instruction, etc.) 
previously formulated by the squadron simulation planning 
team. In addition, discuss the training requirements 
proposed by the tenant lnon-squadron) participants. 
Accommodate, scenario and time permitting, as many of these 
training requests as possible. Conclude the meeting by 
briefly piecing the simulation scenario together, sequencing 
and coordinatin0 the participant training and involvement 
discussed earlier into a "rough draft" proposed schedule of 
events. 
Finally, the coordination effort concludes by 
conducting one additional meeting of all simulation 
participants. During this meeting a table-top exercise of 
the scenario, with all participants responding verbally to 
their actions, is performed. This table-top rehearsal 
enables participants to describe the responses and actions 
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taken by their units throughout the simulation exercise. 
This format will identify prospective problems, gaps, 
deficiencies, etc., that need to be resolved prior to 
administering the actual simulation. 
A list of recommended non-squadron participants 
(depending on the scenario) is as follows: 
1. Wing Safety--(Wing Safety Officer is included as 
squadron simulation planning team member) 
2. Base Operations--Operations Officer and Tower 
Supervisor 
3. Crash/Fire/Rescue--Fire Chief or Assistant Fire Chief 
4. Hospital/Medical--Flight Surgeon and Medical Officer 
5. Explosive Ordnance Disposal--Team Supervisor 
6. Base Security--Security Captain or Security Officer 
7. Base Public Affairs Office--Base PAO or Assistant PAO 
8. Base Command Representative--Contact Chief of Staff 
for representative (Base Operations Officer may 
satisfy this requirement) 
Squadron Preparation 
Preparing, editing, and reviewing the specific 
instructional materials to be taught during the mishap 
simulation is an important segment of the training process. 
These topics, identified during the "procedures to be 
taught" segment discussed earlier, need to be developed and 
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reviewed prior to application. As mentioned earlier, the 
lessons and information given ln the first two sections of 
the "Squadron Premishap Training Program" (Appendix A-1 and 
A-2) provide most of the AMB and duty office instructional 
material required for this task. 
In addition, this phase includes the refinement of the 
simulation scenario (originally developed during the lnltlal 
planning process) and the development of all supporting 
scenario materials. This process involves developing a 
scenario "master plan" descrlbing the step-by-step agenda of 
the entire simulation scenario, in addition to formulatlng a 
"participants script" to be used by the actual scenario 
actors/role-players i.e., aircraft crewmembers, witnesses, 
tower personnel, etc. The "master plan" covers the entire 
mishap scenario process providing a complete time-line of 
the simulation events while the individual "scripts/cue 
cards" given to each simulation role-player describe the 
background and/or level of involvement for each particular 
participant. For example, the tower witness might be given 
a "cue card" stating the following information: 
"The aircraft was cleared for takeoff, the aircrew 
acknowledged the clearance and started the aircraft on 
it's takeoff roll. Next thing I knew the aircraft was 
skidding off the left side of Runway 00 (duty runway) . I 
immediately contacted crash/rescue, etc., via the crash 
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~---------------------------------- --------
phone system. Shortly after, about thirty seconds, the 
aircraft declared an emergency. I didn't see anyone 
depart the aircraft. I did notice a little black smoke 
emanating from the aircraft." "Note: Don't make-up any 
additional fact~. If asked a question you're unsure of, 
state you don't know or don't remember. Thanks for your 
assistance." 
These "cue cards" should be comprehensive enough to 
supply the simulation role-players with a solid narrative 
background for their specific character without supplying 
unnecessary detail. Remember, each role-player should 
either directly support the legitimacy of the scenario or 
provide a specific training purpose ( i.e., role-playing a 
prospective witness to evaluate interviewing techniques, or 
role-playing a media member to evaluate public relations 
capability). Don't over burden the preparation process by 
including unnecessary participants. Keep it simple! 
ADMINISTERING THE SIMULATION 
After all of the previously mentioned planning issues 
have been addressed, the simulation instruction is developed 
and reviewed, and a review of the scenario performed by all 
participants, the actual execution of the exercise can 
occur. This portion of the training program is designed to 
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provide the squadron safety department with additional 
simulation suggestions to use on the day of the simulation. 
(These suggestions can also provide useful initial planning 
information when creating the simulation scenario or when 
sequencing simulation events.) The~e suggestions are 
designed to provide base-line "generic" simulation 
information for the squadron to review and consider both 
before and after scenario administration. 
Simulation Suggestions 
1. Have the squadron simulation planning team meet one-hour 
prior to the assigned starting time. Starting time is 
defined as one-hour before the scheduled launch time of the 
preassigned mishap aircraft/aircrew. Briefly review the 
scenario sequence of events. Resolve any last minute 
questions. Be discrete, don't inadvertently alert other 
squadron members about the commencement of the simulation. 
(An alternative to this process is to establish a block of 
time for the drill to commence i.e., August 3rd, 4th, or 
5th, with no set hours established. This will prompt all 
participants to be adequately prepared for the exercise 
while still providing the important element of surprise.) 
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2. Update, at a minimum, the Squadron Commanding Officer, 
the Wing Commander, and the Base Commanding Officer on the 
exact starting time of the simulation. 
3. Just before the simulated mishap aircraft taxis for 
takeoff, the ASO boards the aircraft and briefs the aircrew. 
(Prior to this briefing, only the Plane Commander/Mission 
Commander is aware of the simulation. The element of 
surprise will afford the squadron a more valuable training 
experience.) The ASO hands out the "cue cards" to each 
member of the crew and informs them of their respective 
role(s) in the simulation. If the medical department or 
crash/rescue requested simulated injuries as part of the 
scenario, the ASO will brief the simulated injuries at this 
time. (Medical will usually make-up triage tags for medical 
personnel to interpret.) The ASO departs the aircraft and 
the plane commences taxi operations. 
4. The Safety Officer contacts the tower, gives the tower 
the aircraft call sign, number of crewmembers on-board, and 
informs the tower that the aircraft has commenced taxi 
operations (The simulation is underway!). The Safety 
Officer also reviews with the tower supervisor the correct 
crash phone terminology used when initiating the exerc1se. 
("This is a drill, this is drill, etc.") 
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5. Simulation instructors assume their respective pos1tions 
to initiate instruction and evaluation. Simulation 
evaluation commences after the tower in1tiates the 
simulation via the crash phone system (this will be scenario 
dependent). 
SIMULATION EVALUATION 
Simulation evaluation is an important phase in the 
simulation training process. The premishap instruction 
provided in the "Squadron Premishap Training Program" is 
designed to bring about the learning of several specific 
kinds of capabilities, ,problem solving, rule learning, 
defining procedures and concepts, information learning, and 
application skills). The base-wide simulation scenario 
provides the environment to actually apply these previously 
learned capabilities and skills under near "operational" 
conditions. Finally, proper simulation evaluation provides 
a means to measure the extent and success of the program's 
learning process. 
This portion of the training program is designed to 
provide the Squadron Safety Department with the informat1on 
to properly evaluate both the performance of each individual 
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SQuadron unit participating in the simulat~on scenario (AMB, 
Duty Office, etc.) and to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
simulation exercise as a whole. 
Individual Unit Evaluation 
Each squadron unit i.e., the AMB, Emergency Reclamation 
Team, Squadron Duty Office Watch Team, etc., participating 
in the mishap simulation needs to be evaluated. As 
mentioned earlier in the "Format of the Critiques" segment 
of this section, these evaluations should be designed in a 
standardized format. In addition, the evaluations should be 
easy-to-use and easy-to-understand. 
The performance based objectives Jisted in the AMB 
lesson plans (Appendix A-1} provide most of the criteria to 
use when formulating the ~B simulation evaluations. These 
lessons will also provide a good model to use when preparing 
simulation evaluations for the other squadron units. To 
help get you started, an example of an AMB evaluation format 
is provided in Figure below. The evaluation illustration 
depicted is designed to evaluate the AMB's mishap 
photographic knowledge/skill using AMB lesson #3, Appendix 
A-1, as a principal reference. This illustration uses the 
same evaluation format designed and used in 
evaluating/assessing the performance of the Duty Office 
Watch Teams. 
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AMB Mishap Photography Evaluation 
Objectives: Given a defined naval aircraft mishap, be able 
to dete~ne what physical evidence at the 
mishap site needs to be photographed in 
accordance with NAVAIR 00-SOT-116-1. 
Obiestiye 11 
Photographer 
Given mishap photographs containing privileged 
information, be able to ezamine and use these 
photographs in accordance with OPNAVINST 
3750.6Q. 
Was the mishap photographer properly briefed on mishap site-
security? 
a Yes a No 
Who briefed the photographer? 
Was the photographer informed to overshoot and underprint? 
a Yes o No 
Was the photographer assisted/directed by an AMB member 
throughout the simulation? 
o Yes o No Comment ________________________________________ _ 
Photographic Requirements 
Did the AMB direct shooting perishable photos first? 
o Yes O No 
Figure 1 
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Did the photographer photograph the minimum required items 
listed in AMB lesson #3? 
c Yes c No 
Circle the required items that were photographed. 
a. mishap site from ground level 
b. impact marks 
c. cockpit switches and controls 
d. major aircraft components 
e. suspect parts 
f. surrounding terrain/damage 
g. damage to aircraft 
Note: the mishap-site photographer will supply the AMB with 
photo contact sheets showing all pictures taken during the 
simulation. The AMB can review the comprehensiveness and 
completeness of the photography effort once given these 
contact sheets. 
Photographic Techniques 
Did the AMB photos start from an overall perspective and 
work to the closeup? 
c Yes c No Comment 
--------------------------------------------
Did the AMB use a ruler or other device for size comparison 
and measurement issues? 
c Yes 0 No Comment __________________________________________ __ 
Did the AMB record the location, subject, and date of each 
photograph? 
c Yes O No Comment __________________________________________ __ 




Outstanding Good Average Fair Unsatisfactory 
5 4 3 2 
(circle one) 
Objectiyt 12 
Fiqure 1 (cont) 
This unco~plicated format will provide the evaluator with a 
performance-based assessment tool that is both easy-to-
formulate and easy-to-administer. 
In addition to the student/unit evaluation mentioned 
above, it is also important to solicit from each instructor 
and/or evaluator involved in the training program their 
comments and/or suggestions pertaining to the planning, 
organizing, administration, and evaluation of the simulation 
exercise. Specifically request both information describing 
the strong elements of the simulation as well as the 
negative or unsatisfactory elements associated with the 
training exercise. This "lessons learned" information is 
extremely helpful when planning a follow-on simulation. 
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Squadron Debrief 
Once all the critiques and evaluations are collected 
and examined, the squadron simulations planning team should 
formally debrief the Commanding Officer on the outcomes of 
the exercise. This process should occur as-soon-as all 
feedback information is thoroughly analyzed, generally 
within a week following the simulation. All aspects of the 
training exercise should be discussed, providing the 
Commanding Officer with the strong and weak training areas 
exposed during the simulation. Action alternatives to the 
deficient areas should be proposed and/or initiated prior to 
this debriefing. 
In addition, provide the non-command participants with 
all assessment materials relating to their performance. 
Provide these units/departments with a copy of the 
simulation recap including relevant simulation "lessons 
learned" information. 
Segment Evaluation 
The "Squadron Premishap Training Program" developed by 
this thesis consists of three different segments: AMB 
Training, Duty Office Watch Team Training, and Base-Wide 
Premishap Simulation Training. This final portion of the 
base-wide training segment provides the squadron Safety 
Department with an evaluation form to use in assessing the 
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effectiveness of each individual segment of the program 
mentioned above. This evaluation form, provided in Appendix 
B-3, should be administered to all "students'' i.e., AMB 
members, duty office watch teams, PAO, etc., after each 
training session. These evaluation forms will assist the 
squadron safety department in determining the effectiveness 
of each area of the training program. If deficiencies are 
noted by the Safety Department, corrective action to 
alleviate the deficiencies can occur. This method of 
training feefDack is an extremely important process in 
maintaining the relevance of the "Squadron Premishap 
Training Program." 
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APPENDIX B. SUPPLEMENTAL PROGRAM MATERIALS 
SUPPLEMENTAL PROGRAM MATERIALS 
B-1 SITE SECURITY BRIEFING 
CHECKLIST 
B-2 MISHAP SITE DO'S AND DON'TS 
BRIEFING CHECKLIST 
B-3 TRAINING EVALUATION FORM 
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APPENDIX B-1. SITE SECURITY BRIEFING CHECKLIST 
BRIEFING CHECKLIST 
1. PROTECT ALL MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PROPERTY AND PERSONNEL. 
2. KEEP SPECTATORS AT A SAFE DISTANCE FROM THE MISHAP SITE. 
A SITE SAFETY PERIMETER NEEDS TO BE/HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED. 
3. ADMIT ONLY AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL TO THE CRASH SCENE. 
A. Personnel displaying squadron/wing approved badges. 
B. Personnel listed on mishap site access rosters. 
C. Personnel escorted or approved by AMB Senior Member. 
The AMB Senior Member is Mr./Ms. 
--------------------
D. Access to the mishap site should be restricted to 
essential medical, EOD, rescue, and fire fighting 
personnel until the site is declared safe. The AMB 
Senior Member will inform sentries of this "safe-
site" declaration. 
4. PREVENT HANDLING OR DISTURBING OF AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE. 
5. TAKE ALL PRECAUTIONS TO PREVENT OBLITERATION OF ANY 
GROUND MARKS/SCARS MADE BY THE AIRCRAFT UPON IMPACT. 
6. REMAIN ON-DUTY UNTIL PROPERLY :ELIEVED. 
A. Provide thorough pass-down of important information 
before discharging duties as sentry. 
7. RESPONSIBILITIES CONCERNING NEWS REPORTERS, 
PHOTOGRAPHERS, AND THE RELEASE OF INFORMATION ARE AS 
FOLLOWS: 
A. Until the mishap site is declared safe, no media will 
be allowed within the established safety per1meter. 
Once the site is declared safe then media will be 
allowed access to mishap site upon approval of AMB 
Senior Member. 
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APPENDIX B-1. SITE SECURITY BRIEFING CHECKLIST (CONT.) 
B. Do no use force to restrict access of personnel into 
site perimeter unless a National Defense Area {NDA) 
has been declared. The AMB Senior Member will inform 
sentries of this notice. 
c. Abstain from any speculation as to the cause of the 
mishap. Refer all inquiries to the AMB Senior Member 
or the Public Affairs Officer. The Public Affairs 
Officer is Mr./Ms. ________________ _ 
D. Politely ask civilians and news media personnel not to 
photograph deceased personnel. 
E. Politely ask civilians and news media personnel not to 
photograph classified equipment or information. If 
they persist, do not try to stop them, but simply 
inform them that it is a criminal offense for anyone 
to photograph, publish, or refuse to surrender 
classified information to proper military authorities. 
8. PREPARE FOR NIGHTTIME OPERATIONS (CLOTHING, GLOVES, 
ETC.). 
9. IN THE EVENT OF PERSONAL INJURY REPORT TO A CORPSMAN/ 
MEDICAL PERSONNEL IMMEDIATELY. 
10.FOLLOW ALL OF THESE BRIEFING ITEMS PERSONALLY. DON'T GET 
BORED IN THE MIDDLE OF THE NIGHT AND DECIDE TO GET 
CURIOUS. 
Source: Technical Manual Safety Investiaation Volume I, 
Mishap Investigation, NAVAIR 00-80T-116-1, May 1987. 
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APPENDIX B-2. MISHAP SITE DO'S AND DON'TS BRIEFING 
INSTRUCTIONAL BRIEF FOR ALL PERSONS INVOLVED IN MISHAP 
INVESTIGATIONS EFFORT 
1. DON'T RELY ON MEMORY--MAKE NOTES AS YOU GO. 
2. DON'T INDISCRIMINATELY DRIVE OR TRAMPLE ON THE GROUND 
NEAR THE SCENE, YOU MAY RUIN VALUABLE GROUND SCARS. 
3. DON'T FLIP PARTS ABOUT, SINCE YOU MAY RUIN VALUABLE 
EVIDENCE. DON'T TOUCH IT, MERELY ENSURE ITS LOCATION IS 
MARKED FOR STUDY LATER. 
4. DON'T RELEASE WRECKAGE UNTIL YOU ARE SURE THAT IT WILL 
NOT BE NEEDED FOR FURTHER EXAMINATION. 
5. DON'T DECIDE THAT YOU ARE ABLE TO ESTABLISH THE CAUSE OF 
A MISHAP UNTIL YOU ARE SURE YOU HAVE CONSIDERED ALL 
RELEVANT ASPECTS OF THE AVAILABLE EVIDENCE, AND THAT YOU 
HAVE ALL THE EVIDENCE THAT IS AVAILABLE. 
6. DON'T JUMP TO A CONCLUSION AS TO THE CAUSE OF A MISHAP--
VITAL EVIDENCE IS OFTEN LOST THROUGH INVESTIGATORS 
TRYING TO TAKE SHORT CUTS. 
7. DON'T DISMANTLE ANY COMPONENTS OF AIRCRAFT WITHOUT 
INSCRIBING REASSEMBLY MARKS ON THEM. THIS APPLIES ALSO 
TO CUTTING SPARS, STRUT WIRES, ETC., THAT YOU MAY NEED 
TO EXAMINE LATER--ALWAYS MARK THEM FIRST. 
8. DON'T DISMANTLE SMALL COMPONENTS ON A DIRTY SURFACE. 
ALWAYS LAY CLEAN MATERIAL UNDER THEM. 
9. DON'T PUT TWO FRACTURED SURFACES TOGETHER SO THAT THEY 
TOUCH, IF THERE IS ANY LIKELIHOOD OF THEIR HAVING TO BE 
MICRO-EXAMINED; KEEP SUCH FRACTURES PROTECTED BY 
WRAPPING. 
10. DON'T LET IT BE THOUGHT THAT THE PURPOSE OF A SAFETY 
INVESTIGATION IS TO APPORTION BLAME; MAKE YOUR STATUS 
CLEAR. 
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APPENDIX B-2. MISHAP SITE DO'S AND DON'T BRIEFING (CONT.) 
11. DON'T LOOK FOR ONLY ONE CAUSE. MOST MISHAPS ARE DUE TO 
A NUMBER OF CAUSES. ALL FACTORS SHOULD BE STATED SO THAT 
THEY MAY BE ANALYZED AND FORM THE BASIS OF ALL 
SUBSEQUENT ACTION TO PROVIDE REMEDIES. 
12. DON'T DISCUSS THE MISHAP WITH PERSONS NOT DIRECTLY 
RELATED TO THE INVESTIGATION. 
13. DO TALK TO WITNESSES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER THE 
MISHAP. 
14. DO VISIT THE SCENE. GET AS MUCH FIRST-HAND INFORMATION 
AS YOU CAN POSSIBLE GET. MAKE SKETCHES, TAKE 
MEASUREMENTS, AND WRITE DOWN ALL INFORMATION. 
15. DO REMEMBER THAT THIS IS YOUR FULL-TIME, PRIMARY DUTY 
UNTIL THE INVESTIGATION IS COMPLETE. 
STANDARD POLICIES 
1. USE EXTREME COURTESY WHEN TAKING TO THE PUBLIC OR NEWS 
MEDIA PERSONNEL. EACH INDIVIDUAL'S CONDUCT MUST ENHANCE 
RATHER THAN DEGRADE COMMUNITY RELATIONS. 
2. ABSTAIN FROM ANY SPECULATIONS AS TO THE CAUSE OF THE 
MISHAP. 
3. REFER ALL QUESTIONS FROM THE PUBLIC OR NEWS MEDIA TO THE 
AMB SENIOR MEMBER OR THE DESIGNATED PAO. 
4. POLITELY ASK CIVILIAN AND NEWS MEDIA PERSONNEL NOT TO 
PHOTOGRAPH DECEASED PERSONNEL. 
5. POLITELY ASK CIVILIAN AND NEWS MEDIA PERSONNEL NOT TO 
PHOTOGRAPH CLASSIFIED EQUIPMENT OR INFORMATION. IF THEY 
PERSIST, DO NOT TRY TO STOP THEM, BUT SIMPLY INFORM THEM 
THAT IT IS C CRIMINAL OFFENSE FOR ANYONE TO PHOTOGRAPH, 
PUBLISH, OR REFUSE TO SURRENDER CLASSIFIED INFORMATION 
TO PROPER MILITARY AUTHORITIES. 
6. RESTRICT ENTRY TO THE CORDONED MISHAP SITE TO AUTHORIZED 
PERSONNEL ONLY. 
Source: Technical Manual Safety Investigation Volume I, 
Mishap Investigation, NAVAIR 00-80T-116-1, May 1987. 
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APPENDIX B-3 . TRAINING EVALUATION FORM 
Course/Lesson Date ____________ __ 
Instructor(s) ________________________________________________ __ 
1. Was the course/lesson well organized? 
0 Yes 0 No Comment ________________________________________ ___ 
2. Was time spent effectively during the training? 
0 Yes 0 No Comment 
-------------------------------------------
3. Was the instructor adequately prepared for the lesson 
and/or training? 
0 Yes 0 No Comment ________________________________________ ___ 
4. Were difficult concepts made understandable? 
0 Yes 0 No Comment ________________________________________ __ 
5. Did the instructor invite questions and if so were 
adequate answers provided? 
0 Yes 0 No Comment ________________________________________ ___ 
6. Were the objectives of the training made clear? 
0 Yes 0 No Comment 
-------------------------------------------
7. Was instruction sufficient to enable you to perform the 
required practical application(s)? 
0 Yes 0 No Comment ________________________________________ _ 
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APPENDIX B-3. TRAINING EVALUATION FORM (CONT.) 
8. Was there any material, concepts, or subject matter that 
was difficult to learn during the training; please list and 
comment why. 
0 Yes 0 No Comment ________________________________________ ___ 
9. Was the training a worthwhile learning experience? 
0 Yes 0 No Comment ________________________________________ ___ 
10. Do you have any suggestions to increase the level of 
instruction and/or training provided by this course/lesson? 
0 Yes 0 No Comment 
-------------------------------------------
11. Any additional comments? ________________________________ __ 
Thank-you for you time, assistance, and comments! 
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